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THE PATH OUT OF WASHINGTON’S TAKINGS
QUAGMIRE: THE CASE FOR ADOPTING THE FEDERAL
TAKINGS ANALYSIS
Roger D. Wynne
Abstract: A quagmire awaits anyone attempting to understand the analysis Washington
courts employ to determine whether government action constitutes a “taking” of property for
which compensation is due under the U.S. Constitution. The Washington takings analysis is
complex and confounding, especially when compared to the relatively straightforward
takings analysis established by the U.S. Supreme Court. This Article argues that the
Washington State Supreme Court should reject the Washington takings analysis and adopt
the federal analysis. Comparing the federal and Washington analyses underscores how, as a
matter of form, the Washington analysis easily stymies those who must work with it.
Substantively, the Washington analysis is unfounded on three key levels: (1) the existence of
differences between the two analyses fatally undermines the Washington analysis; (2) the
nature of those differences renders the Washington analysis constitutionally insufficient by
lowering the floor of protection that property owners enjoy under the federal analysis; and
(3) the differences do not enhance the federal analysis. Rejecting the Washington takings
analysis in favor of the federal analysis would be consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis
because the Washington State Supreme Court originally intended to harmonize Washington
and federal takings law, even though the Court failed to implement that intent. When
embracing the federal takings analysis, the Court should avoid mischaracterizations of the
federal takings analysis and the temptation to justify the Washington analysis on independent
state constitutional grounds for the first time.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the Washington State Supreme Court breathed a sigh of
relief. Looking back, the Court lamented the “quagmire” into which
Washington and federal courts had wandered when analyzing claims that
government regulation constituted a taking of private property for which
compensation was due:1
The “tests” for over-regulation have until recently proved
somewhat of a quagmire of constitutional theory vacillating
between substantive due process and “takings” theory. Both this
court and the United States Supreme Court have in the past
struggled with the difficult determination of where a mere
regulation ends and a “taking” commences.2
Looking ahead, however, the Court expressed confidence that it had
found a path out of the quagmire through a comprehensive takings
analysis harmonizing Washington and federal takings law.3 Although the

1. As interpreted by federal courts, the U.S. Constitution prohibits the taking of private property
by the government, whether through regulation or physical appropriation, without compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537–38 (2005). The
Washington State Supreme Court reads the parallel provision in the Washington Constitution,
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16, as providing the “same right.” Sintra v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119
Wash. 2d 1, 13, 829 P.2d 765, 772 (1992); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 657, 747 P.2d
1062, 1082 (1987) (“[T]he breadth of constitutional protection under the state and federal just
compensation clauses remains virtually identical.”).
2. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 328, 787 P.2d 907, 911 (1990).
3. Id. at 329–37, 787 P.2d at 912–16. As used in this Article, a “takings analysis” comprises the
series of questions or tests a court employs to determine whether a taking has occurred.
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Court refined this analysis through 1993, the Court never questioned its
1990 pronouncement that its takings analysis delivered Washington from
the takings quagmire.
The Court’s confidence has proved unwarranted. Washington remains
mired in a cumbersome, confusing, and constitutionally suspect takings
analysis. The Court should extricate Washington from this situation by
adopting the federal takings analysis.
Part I of this Article compares the straightforward federal takings
analysis with Washington’s complex and disjointed takings analysis.
Part II explains how the Washington takings analysis is unfounded on
three key levels: (1) it is fatally undermined by the fact that it differs
from the analysis established by the U.S. Supreme Court; (2) the nature
of those differences renders the Washington analysis constitutionally
insufficient by lowering the floor of protection that property owners
enjoy under the federal takings analysis; and (3) the differences do not
improve the federal analysis. Part III demonstrates how overruling
Washington’s takings case law would be consistent with the doctrine of
stare decisis, and cautions the Washington State Supreme Court to avoid
mischaracterizations of the federal takings analysis and the temptation to
justify the Washington analysis on independent state constitutional
grounds for the first time.4

4. This Article focuses on claims that government action, most often in the form of a regulation,
constitutes a “taking” within the meaning of constitutional protections. This Article excludes at least
four related but conceptually distinct claims:
1. No public purpose or use. A property owner may assert that the government lacks the
authority to take property, even if compensated, because the taking is not for a “public
purpose” or “public use” within the meaning of the federal or Washington takings
jurisprudence. This Article discusses that type of claim only to distinguish it from the type of
claim at issue in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 276–78.
2. Physical exactions. In an “exaction” claim, the issue is whether the government, instead
of paying for a physical easement, may demand or “exact” it as a condition of granting a land
use permit sought by the claimant. A court cannot address an “exaction” claim until the court
has already concluded that the government has taken property or proposes to take it. See
generally Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 546–47.
3. Monetary exactions. Whether a government-imposed fee or charge constitutes a taking is
subject to an analysis different from the analysis used to assess whether the government has
taken real property. See Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wash. 2d 12, 31–32, 18 P.3d 523, 533–34
(2001) (“[I]f a charge is ‘reasonably related’ to either a benefit provided to, or a burden
produced by, a particular citizen it is not a taking.”).
4. Damage. Unlike the Federal Takings Clause, the Washington takings clause adds that
property may not be “damaged” without compensation. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16. For a
discussion of the potential significance of that addition, see infra text accompanying notes
300–01.
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THE WASHINGTON TAKINGS ANALYSIS IS MORE
COMPLEX AND CONFOUNDING THAN THE FEDERAL
TAKINGS ANALYSIS

Stark differences exist between the analyses federal and Washington
courts apply to a takings claim brought under the U.S. Constitution.
Federal courts employ a straightforward, three-part analysis. Washington
courts, by contrast, use the three parts of the federal takings analysis,
plus three unique elements arranged in a complex series of questions and
sub-questions. Washington takings case law is confusing and often
difficult to reconcile. The result is a quagmire that vexes attorneys and
judges alike.
A.

The Federal Takings Analysis Is Relatively Simple and Omits Due
Process Considerations

Key to understanding the evolution and current form of the federal
takings analysis is the distinction between the federal Due Process and
Takings Clauses. The Due Process Clause that regulates state action is in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and provides:
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”5 The constitutional remedy for government
action that violates this prohibition is the invalidation of the action, not
the payment of compensation.6 By contrast, the Takings Clause is in the
Fifth Amendment and states: “[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”7 The remedy for a violation of
this prohibition is the payment of compensation, not the invalidation of
the action.8 The U.S. Supreme Court struggled for a period of decades to
keep these two provisions analytically distinct.

5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 649, 747 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1987). A statutory right to
compensation may be available where government action violates due process protections. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). See, e.g., Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 131 Wash. 2d 640, 651–54,
935 P.2d 555, 561–64 (1997) (discussing the availability of this statutory remedy in Washington
courts). As a purely constitutional matter, however, the remedy is injunctive.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994) (“The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution [is] made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
8. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 649, 747 P.2d at 1077; see also First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987) (“As its language indicates, and as
the Court has frequently noted, this provision does not prohibit the taking of private property, but
instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.”).
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The U.S. Supreme Court initially acknowledged the distinction
between the Due Process and Takings Clauses in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge.9 Challenging the constitutionality of a new zoning
ordinance that limited the uses he could make of his land, the property
owner in Nectow did not allege a violation of the Takings Clause, but of
his due process rights.10 He did not seek compensation; he sought to
relieve his property from the newly imposed use limitations.11 The Court
ruled in his favor. Using a substantive due process test that remains
largely unchanged today, the Court ruled that a zoning ordinance
“cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”12 Because the Court found
that the use limitations placed on the property by the zoning ordinance in
Nectow did not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare, the Court ruled that the ordinance violated
the Due Process Clause.13 As the property owner requested, the remedy
in Nectow was not compensation, but freeing the property from the use
limitation.14
Fifty years later, in 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court overlooked this
distinction and conflated due process and takings law. In Agins v. City of
Tiburon,15 property owners alleged that a local zoning ordinance
effected a taking under the Fifth Amendment, not a violation of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.16 Accordingly, they sought
compensation, not invalidation of the law.17 Faced with this takings
challenge, the Court curiously turned to Nectow, a case that involved
only a due process challenge. Citing Nectow, the Court added a new

9. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
10. Id. at 185.
11. Id. at 186.
12. Id. at 188. For current statements of the substantive due process test, see Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (“[A] regulation that fails to serve any legitimate
governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process
Clause.”), and N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Crown
Point Dev. Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 2007)) (noting that a due process
claim exists where “land use action lacks any substantial relation to the public health, safety, or
general welfare” and that “[t]he irreducible minimum of a substantive due process claim challenging
land use regulation is failure to advance any governmental purpose”).
13. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188–89.
14. Id.
15. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
16. Id. at 258.
17. Id. at 259.
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element to the federal takings analysis: government action effects a
taking if it does not “substantially advance legitimate state interests.”18
Agins began a quarter-century misadventure for federal takings law.
Even if mostly in dicta, the Court continued to recite the Agins
“substantially advances” element as part of the federal takings analysis
in subsequent cases.19
The U.S. Supreme Court corrected its mistake in 2005. Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.20 involved a state statute intended to protect small,
independent gas station operators by reducing the amount of rent that oil
companies could charge their gas station dealers.21 An oil company
challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the Takings
Clause.22 Invoking Agins and its progeny, the oil company argued that
the statute took its property—and thus the government owed the
company compensation—because the statute failed to substantially
advance a legitimate state interest.23
Although the company’s argument prevailed as the case shifted
several times between the federal district and circuit courts,24 a
unanimous and contrite U.S. Supreme Court ultimately rejected that
argument. The Court ruled that it had erred in Agins: “Today we correct
course. We hold that the ‘substantially advances’ formula is not a valid
takings test, and indeed conclude that it has no proper place in our
takings jurisprudence.”25 The Court removed the “substantially
advances” element because it was aimed at the wrong target. The
“substantially advances” element is “derived from due process, not
takings, precedents”26 and ultimately probes whether a regulation is
effective, not whether it takes property.27 “The notion that . . . a

18. Id. at 260. Applying that analysis to the challenged zoning ordinance, the Court ultimately
rejected the challenge. Id. at 261–63.
19. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005) (“[I]n most of the cases reciting
the ‘substantially advances’ formula, the Court has merely assumed its validity when referring to it
in dicta.” (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
334 (2002); Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999); Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992);
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985))).
20. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
21. Id. at 532–33.
22. Id. at 533.
23. Id. at 533–34.
24. Id. at 534–36.
25. Id. at 548.
26. Id. at 540.
27. Id. at 542.
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regulation . . .‘takes’ private property for public use merely by virtue of
its ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.”28 Instead, the goal of the
federal takings analysis is “to identify regulatory actions that are
functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government
directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his
domain.”29 To do that, the federal analysis “focuses directly upon the
severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property
rights.”30 By contrast, Agins’ “substantially advances” element “reveals
nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular
regulation imposes upon private property rights.”31
In correcting course by removing the “substantially advances”
element, Lingle provided a concise summary of the three remaining
elements of the federal takings analysis. Two of those elements probe
“categorical” or “per se” takings.32 First, in a test associated most closely
with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,33 a taking occurs
“where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical
invasion of her property—however minor . . . .”34 Second, using the test
announced in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,35 government
actions constitute takings where they “completely deprive an owner of
‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of her property . . . except to the
extent that ‘background principles of nuisance and property law’
independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property.”36
Federal courts refer to that element as a test for a “total regulatory
taking” or “total taking.”37

28. Id. at 543.
29. Id. at 539.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 542 (emphasis in original). Because the oil company relied exclusively on the
“substantially advances” element, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the challenged statute without
applying any of the other elements of the federal takings analysis. Id. at 545.
32. Id. at 538 (using “per se” and “categorical”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1015 (1992) (“categorical”).
33. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
34. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. 419).
35. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
36. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1019, 1027–32).
37. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (“total regulatory taking”); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (“total
taking”).
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Finally, in situations that do not present a per se taking, federal courts
apply the factors established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City38:
Primary among those factors are “[t]he economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.” In addition, the “character of the governmental
action”—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion
or instead merely affects property interests through “some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good”—may be relevant in discerning
whether a taking has occurred.39
For government action that survives application of the two per se
elements, the Penn Central factors preclude resort to a single, yes-or-no
question for resolving whether that action constitutes a taking.40
Although the U.S. Supreme Court understands that each of the Penn
Central factors “has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions,” the
Court still embraces those factors as “the principal guidelines” for
resolving takings claims left unresolved by the per se elements of the
federal analysis.41
Graphically, the federal takings analysis comprises the Loretto
physical invasion element, the Lucas “total [regulatory] taking” element,
and the Penn Central factors in a simple, sequential order:

38. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
39. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (citations omitted) (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
40. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (characterizing the factors as requiring “essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries” rather than a “set formula”).
41. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
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The Washington Takings Analysis Remains a Quagmire for Those
Who Must Discern and Apply It

Little is simple about the Washington takings analysis, which must be
extracted from confusing case law. The Washington analysis remains a
quagmire that stymies those who must use it.
1.

The Complex Washington Takings Analysis Must Be Coaxed from
Disjointed Case Law

Washington case law has no analogue to Lingle. No single decision
succinctly outlines the elements of the Washington takings analysis.
Most recitations of the Washington analysis point to Guimont v. Clarke
(Guimont I),42 issued in 1993, as the Washington State Supreme Court’s
takings summary.43 Unfortunately, even Guimont I fails to fully or

42. 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993).
43. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. McCoy, 101 Wash. App. 815, 828, 4 P.3d 159, 166 (2000) (stating
that Guimont I “outlines the framework for analyzing regulatory takings”); WASH. STATE ATT’Y
GEN., ADVISORY MEMORANDUM: AVOIDING UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY,
at 9 (2006) [hereinafter AG MEMO]; Elaine L. Spencer, Regulatory Taking and Inverse
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clearly cover all the elements of the Washington takings analysis. As a
result, the Washington analysis must be pieced together from disjointed
case law.44
An elaborate picture of the Washington takings analysis emerges
from that exercise:

Understanding the elements of the Washington takings analysis—and
how it differs from the federal analysis—requires attention to detail and
tolerance for complexity and inconsistencies.
The Washington analysis employs the three elements that compose
the federal analysis. Under the Washington analysis, and consistent with
the federal analysis, courts begin by asking whether the government has

Condemnation, in 7 WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, WASH. REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK § 110.4(1), at
110-16, § 110.4(2)–(3) (Edward W. Kuhrau et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996).
44. In addition to Guimont I, the primary decisions through which the Washington State Supreme
Court developed the Washington takings analysis were Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121
Wash. 2d 625, 854 P.2d 23 (1993); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318
(1992); Sintra v. City of Seattle (Sintra I) 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765 (1992); and Presbytery of
Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990).
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physically invaded private property.45 If the court finds no physical
invasion, it poses a question nearly identical to the one federal courts
ask: whether the government has committed a “total [regulatory] taking”
by denying the property owner “all economically viable use.”46 The
Washington analysis ends with another element based on, even if not
identical to, the federal Penn Central factors.47 What distinguishes
Washington’s approach are three unique elements sandwiched between
those endpoints.
The first unique Washington element generally asks whether the
regulation destroys some other fundamental attribute of property
ownership, such as the right to possess, exclude others, or dispose.48
Highlighting the imprecision of this element, the Washington State
Supreme Court poses this question using a variety of verbs without
appearing to intend different meanings—it does not seem to matter
whether the regulation destroys,49 denies,50 deprives,51 derogates,52
infringes on,53 or merely implicates54 some other fundamental attribute
of property ownership.
45. Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 644, 854 P.2d at 33–34; Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 597, 854 P.2d
at 7; accord Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (analogous
federal authority).
46. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 600, 602, 605, 854 P.2d at 9–10, 12 . The U.S. Supreme Court,
by contrast, asks whether the government has denied the property owner all economically beneficial
use. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 1026–32 (1992).
This Article urges the Washington State Supreme Court to adopt the federal analysis directly, which
would mean using “beneficial” rather than “viable” in this element of the analysis. See infra text
accompanying notes 262–63.
47. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 596, 854 P.2d at 6; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335–36, 787
P.2d at 915. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Washington State Supreme Court casts these
factors as probing whether the state’s legitimate interest is outweighed by the adverse economic
impact on the landowner. See, e.g., Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 604, 854 P.2d at 11; see also Peste
v. Mason Cnty., 133 Wash. App. 456, 473, 136 P.3d 140, 149 (2006); Guimont v. City of Seattle
(Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 81, 896 P.2d 70, 76–77 (1995). This Article urges the Washington
State Supreme Court to correct this mischaracterization of the Penn Central factors. See infra Part
III.B.1.
48. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 601–02, 854 P.2d at 10; Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash.
2d 34, 49–50, 52, 830 P.2d 318, 328–29 (1992); Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–30, 333 & n.21,
787 P.2d at 912, 914 & n.21.
49. See Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 643, 854 P.2d at 33; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50, 52, 830
P.2d at 328–29; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–30, 787 P.2d at 912.
50. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914.
51. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 605 n.7, 854 P.2d at 12 n.7.
52. See Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49, 830 P.2d at 328.
53. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333 n.21, 787 P.2d at 914 n.21.
54. See Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 645, 854 P.2d at 34; Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 601, 603, 854
P.2d at 9, 10.
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Regardless of the verb it employs, the Washington State Supreme
Court lumps the “fundamental attribute” element with two from the
federal analysis—the “physical invasion” and “total [regulatory] taking”
elements—into what the Court deems the first “threshold question.”55
This grouping is odd because it does not actually comprise a single
question. The “physical invasion” and “total [regulatory] taking”
elements probe per se takings—affirmative answers to either of those
elements ends the analysis with a finding of a taking.56 By contrast,
application of the “fundamental attribute” element cannot end the
analysis, but can only determine where the analysis turns next. If the
challenged regulation does not destroy (or perhaps deny, deprive,
derogate, infringe on, or merely implicate) a fundamental attribute of
property ownership, the analysis moves to the second “threshold
question”;57 otherwise, the analysis proceeds to what Washington deems
the “takings analysis.”58
The second “threshold question” consists of the second unique
Washington element. It asks whether the regulation “seeks less to
55. See Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 643–45, 854 P.2d at 33–34; Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594–
95, 854 P.2d at 6. The Court also refers to this as the first “threshold inquiry.” Margola, 121 Wash.
2d at 643, 854 P.2d at 33; Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 602–03, 854 P.2d at 10. Washington courts
are not always clear about whether this question (or inquiry) consists of all three elements or just
one. For example, one court recently cast the entire first threshold question as asking simply if there
has been a “total taking.” Conner v. City of Seattle, 153 Wash. App. 673, 698, 223 P.3d 1201, 1214
(2009), review denied, 168 Wash. 2d 1040 (2010). More frequently, Washington courts pose the
first threshold question in terms solely of the “fundamental attribute” element, while mentioning the
rights to exclude others (which necessarily includes a right against physical invasions) or to make
some economically viable use of one’s property (which is implicit in the “total taking” element of
the takings analysis) as mere examples of fundamental attributes. See, e.g., Margola, 121 Wash. 2d
at 643–44, 854 P.2d at 33–34; Peste v. Mason Cnty., 133 Wash. App. 456, 471, 136 P.3d 140, 148
(2006); Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 770, 102 P.3d 173, 179 (2004);
Edmonds Shopping Cntr. Assocs. v. City of Edmonds, 117 Wash. App. 344, 362, 71 P.3d 233, 241
(2003); City of Seattle v. McCoy, 101 Wash. App. 815, 828, 4 P.3d 159, 166 (2000); Kahuna Land
Co. v. Spokane Cnty., 94 Wash. App. 836, 841–42, 974 P.2d 1250, 1252 (1999).
56. See Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 644, 854 P.2d at 33–34; Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 602–03,
854 P.2d at 10.
57. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 10.
58. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603–04, 854 P.2d at 10–11. Deepening the inscrutability of
Washington takings case law, the Washington State Supreme Court reordered the two threshold
questions in 1993. Id. at 600–01. As a result, pre-1993 case law discussing the first threshold
question is actually discussing what is now the second threshold question. See, e.g., Presbytery, 114
Wash. 2d at 329–30, 787 P.2d at 912. This complicates the task facing anyone attempting to
research the background and relationship of the elements that compose the Washington takings
analysis.
The Washington State Supreme Court first explained the rationale for grouping the elements of
the Washington analysis into “threshold questions” and a “takings analysis” in Presbytery. Id. This
Article explains and critiques that rationale. See infra Part II.B.
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prevent a harm than to impose on those regulated the requirement of
providing an affirmative public benefit.”59 Under this element,
government action designed primarily to prevent a harm is insulated
from takings claims, whereas government action that primarily seeks to
provide a public benefit enjoys no such protection.60 Clouding
application of this element is a debate over whether it poses the relevant
question. One faction of the Washington State Supreme Court argued
that the proper question initially was, and should have remained,
whether the regulation is employed to enhance the value of publicly held
property.61 Despite this protest and lingering confusion over the proper
question posed by this element,62 most Washington courts recite a “seeks
less to prevent a harm than to impose an affirmative public benefit”
question as a unique element of the Washington takings analysis.63
If the government has not committed a per se taking, and if either of
Washington’s threshold questions yields an affirmative answer, the
Washington analysis proceeds to what the Washington State Supreme
Court calls the “takings analysis.”64 This label leaves the misimpression
that the “threshold questions” are somehow outside the Washington
takings analysis. Nevertheless, what the Washington State Supreme
Court labels the “takings analysis” begins with the third element unique
59. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 10 (quoting Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49,
830 P.2d at 328); Sintra v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 829 P.2d 765, 772 (1992).
60. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 10; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–30 &
n.13, 787 P.2d at 912 & n.13.
61. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 617–20, 854 P.2d at 18–20 (Utter, J., concurring) (citing
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329, 787 P.2d at 912; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 651, 747
P.2d 1062, 1078 (1987)). Although not cited in any of the Washington case law relevant to this
debate, historical support for an “enhance the value of publicly held property” element was offered
by a scholar who, in a 1980 article, argued that a taking must involve a transfer of property from a
property owner to a government with the power of eminent domain and “only when governmental
land receives ‘special’ benefits or perhaps ‘special and direct’ benefits.” William B. Stoebuck,
Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1091–93 (1980).
62. See, e.g., Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 355, 13 P.3d 183,
187 (2000) (summarizing the question in dicta as whether “the regulations were employed to
enhance the value of publicly held property” (citing Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 651, 747 P.2d at
1078)).
63. See, e.g., Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 131 Wash. 2d 640, 676, 935 P.2d 555, 573
(1997) (Durham, J., concurring) (citing Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 595, 854 P.2d at 6) (“A
restriction or condition on the use of property which goes beyond the prevention of harm to provide
an affirmative ‘benefit to the public’ may constitute a regulatory taking.”); Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce
Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 770–74, 102 P.3d 173, 179–81 (2004); Rhoades v. City of Battle
Ground, 115 Wash. App. 752, 772, 63 P.3d 142, 152 (2002).
64. “The court first asks two threshold questions to determine if a regulation is susceptible to a
takings challenge. If the regulation passes this threshold inquiry, the court proceeds to a takings
analysis.” Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594, 854 P.2d at 5.
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to Washington takings law: Does the regulation substantially advance a
legitimate state interest?65 This, of course, is the due process-based
question that Lingle removed from the federal analysis in 2005.66 If the
court answers that question in the negative, the regulation is a taking.67 If
the answer is affirmative, the court proceeds to the final element, which
is based on the Penn Central factors adopted from the federal analysis.68
2.

Federal Courts, the Washington Court of Appeals, and Attorneys
Struggle to Apply the Washington Takings Analysis

The complexity of the Washington takings analysis is perhaps lost on
the Washington State Supreme Court, which has avoided entangling
itself in its own creation. After developing the Washington takings
analysis from 1987 through 1993,69 the Court essentially exited the
takings field. Since then, the Court has either denied review of actual
takings cases,70 resolved takings claims without resorting to (or even
mentioning) the Washington analysis,71 or reviewed collateral takings

65. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914.
66. For a discussion of Lingle, see supra text accompanying notes 20–31.
67. Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 645, 854 P.2d 23, 35 (1993).
68. Id. at 645–46, 854 P.2d at 35. Connecting the factors recited in Margola to Penn Central
involves several steps. See id. (citing Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 336,
787 P.2d 907, 915 (1990)); Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 336 n.30, 787 P.2d at 915 n.30 (citing
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)); Keystone, 480 U.S.
at 495 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at
175 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
69. This Article details and critiques the evolution of the Washington takings analysis. See infra
text accompanying notes 111–37.
70. See, e.g., Peste v. Mason Cnty., 133 Wash. App. 456, 471–73, 136 P.3d 140, 148–49 (2006),
review denied, 159 Wash. 2d 1013, 154 P.3d 919 (2007); City of Des Moines v. Gray Buss., LLC,
130 Wash. App. 600, 611–15, 124 P.3d 324, 330–32 (2005), review denied, 158 Wash. 2d 1024,
149 P.3d 379 (2006); Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 767–74, 102 P.3d 173,
177–81 (2004), review denied, 154 Wash. 2d 1027, 120 P.3d 73 (2005); Guimont v. City of Seattle
(Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 79–85, 896 P.2d 70, 75–79, review denied, 127 Wash. 2d 1023,
904 P.2d 1157 (1995).
71. Brutsche v. City of Kent, 164 Wash. 2d 664, 680–84, 193 P.3d 110, 119–21 (2008) (applying
Eggleston v. Pierce County, 148 Wash. 2d 760, 64 P.3d 618 (2002), to resolve the Washington
constitutional claim, and applying federal law to the federal takings claim); Tiffany Family Trust
Corp. v. City of Kent, 155 Wash. 2d 225, 233–37, 119 P.3d 325, 332–32 (2005) (refusing to
entertain the takings claim because the claimant failed to follow statutory procedural prerequisites);
Eggleston, 148 Wash. 2d at 768–69, 64 P.3d at 623–24 (resolving the case on historical evidence
that, when Washington adopted its constitution, damaging property for evidence in a criminal case
did not constitute a taking); Asarco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 145 Wash. 2d 750, 760–61, 43 P.3d
471, 476 (2001) (dismissing the takings claim as unripe, and in dictum citing only federal takings
authority).
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issues unrelated to whether a government action constituted a taking for
which compensation was due.72
The closest the Court came to applying the Washington analysis was
in Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington v. State.73
Manufactured Housing did not involve the usual assertion of a taking
remediable through compensation. Instead, the case involved a facial
challenge to the validity of a statute that gave qualified tenants a right of
first refusal to purchase their mobile home parks.74 Because the plaintiff
property owners sought to invalidate the statute, their claim was
premised on an argument that the government lacked the authority to
take any property, even if compensated.75 The Court reasoned that,
before it could determine whether the government had the authority to
take property through that statute, the Court first had to determine
whether the statute, if it were applied, would actually take property.76 To
do that, the Court purported to apply the Washington analysis.77 In
reality, the Court resolved Manufactured Housing by applying law that
differed from that analysis in two crucial respects.
First, Manufactured Housing misstated the Washington analysis.
Citing its prior takings decisions, the Court reported that a regulation
could be challenged on a “facial” or “categorical” basis for four reasons,
including that the regulation destroys any fundamental attribute of
property ownership.78 Applying that rule, Manufactured Housing
concluded that the challenged statute would constitute a taking solely
because it would deprive owners of the right of first refusal, which the

72. Dickgeister v. State, 153 Wash. 2d 530, 538–42, 105 P.2d 26, 30–32 (2005) (finding that
logging activity constituted a “public use” such that an inverse condemnation claim should be
allowed to proceed to trial, but not applying any takings analysis to the facts of that case);
Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 370–74, 13 P.3d 183, 194–96
(2000) (finding that the potential taking would not be for a “public use”); Phillips v. King Cnty.,
136 Wash. 2d 946, 959–60, 964–65, 968 P.2d 871 (1998) (refusing to treat the claim as raising a
regulatory takings issue, as the court of appeals had); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 131
Wash. 2d 640, 644–45, 935 P.2d 555, 558 (1997) (dealing with the amount of compensation due
after constitutional violations had already been established).
73. 142 Wash. 2d 347, 13 P.3d 183 (2000).
74. Id. at 351, 13 P.3d at 185.
75. Id. at 353, 13 P.3d at 186; see also infra text accompanying note 273 (discussing
Manufactured Housing in the context of its decision to invoke independent state constitutional
grounds for its decision).
76. Manufactured Housing, 142 Wash. 2d at 363–64, 13 P.3d at 191.
77. Id. at 355, 13 P.3d at 187 (reciting certain elements of the Washington analysis); id. at 363–
68, 13 P.3d at 191–94 (applying one of those elements).
78. Id. at 355, 13 P.3d at 187.
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court deemed a fundamental attribute of property ownership.79 But no
such rule exists. Under the Washington takings analysis, the only way to
prove a facial or categorical taking is to establish either a physical
invasion or a total regulatory taking.80 Beyond that, even if a property
owner establishes that a regulation infringes on some other fundamental
attribute of property ownership, the owner must still prove, on a factspecific basis, that the regulation does not advance a legitimate state
interest or fails application of the Penn Central factors.81 Because
Manufactured Housing neither followed nor overruled the Washington
takings analysis the Court had finalized just seven years earlier, the
decision remains little more than an example of the inconsistency
plaguing Washington takings jurisprudence.
Second, Manufactured Housing added yet another reason, untethered
to the Washington analysis, for finding that the challenged statute would
take property. Through elusive logic, Manufactured Housing leapt from
dated case law about the authority to condemn property to a conclusion
that a taking may be proven through an implicit “condemnatory effect”:
Washington law recognizes that “‘[t]he authority to condemn
must be expressly given or necessarily implied.’” State ex rel.
Wauconda Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Wash. 660, 662, 124
P. 127 (1912) (emphasis added) (quoting 1 John Lewis, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed.) § 371, at
679 (3d ed. 1909)). While [the challenged statute] says nothing

79. Id. at 368, 13 P.3d at 193.
80. Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 602–03, 854 P.2d 1, 10 (1993).
81. Id. at 603–04, 13 P.2d at 10–11. Manufactured Housing also said that merely proving that
“the regulations were employed to enhance the value of publicly [owned] property” would, like the
“fundamental attribute” element, be sufficient to establish a “facial” or “categorical” taking.
Manufactured Housing, 142 Wash. 2d at 355, 13 P.3d at 187. Although Manufactured Housing did
not actually apply the “enhance the value of publicly owned property” test, its recitation of that test
suffered from two problems. First, as with the “fundamental attribute” test, the Court misstated its
own precedent, which maintains that a facial or categorical taking may be proven only by
establishing a physical invasion or a deprivation of all economically viable use. See Guimont I, 121
Wash. 2d at 602–04, 854 P.2d at 10–11. Second, seven years before Manufactured Housing, the
Court declined to use “enhance the value of publicly owned property” as an element of the
Washington analysis, and held instead that the question is really whether the regulation seeks less to
prevent a harm than to impose the requirement of providing an affirmative public benefit. Compare
Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 10 (identifying the element) with id., 121 Wash. 2d at
617–20, 854 P.2d at 18–20 (Utter, J., concurring) (arguing unsuccessfully that the element should be
phrased as whether a regulation is used to enhance the value of publicly owned property). See supra
text accompanying notes 61–63.
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about condemnation, its condemnatory effect is necessarily
implied.82
Manufactured Housing cited no Washington or federal case law for this
“condemnatory effect” test. None exists in the Washington takings
analysis.
Although the Washington State Supreme Court has managed to
sidestep its own takings analysis, the rest of Washington’s legal
community has not. Federal courts have drawn different and often
incorrect lessons from the Washington takings analysis. For example, in
Heitman v. City of Spokane Valley,83 the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington eschewed the Washington analysis
altogether and applied only the federal analysis to resolve a takings
claim brought under the U.S. and Washington State Constitutions.84 By
contrast, in Tapps Brewing, Inc. v. City of Sumner,85 the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington first applied the federal
analysis to resolve a federal takings claim, and then applied the
Washington analysis on the mistaken assumption that it is unique to
claims under the Washington State Constitution.86 Furthermore, the
court in Tapps Brewing was confused by the Washington analysis. The
court reported that affirmative answers to Washington’s threshold
questions mean that the challenged government action is “susceptible to
a constitutional taking challenge,” while a negative answer means that
the action is “subjected to a Penn Central type analysis.”87 There is,
however, no actual difference between a “taking challenge” under the
Washington analysis and application of the Penn Central factors; the

82. Manufactured Housing, 142 Wash. 2d at 369–70 (emphasis in original); id., 13 P.3d at 194
(same, but incorrectly citing In re Willis Ave., 56 Mich. 244, 22 N.W. 871 (1885), rather than Lewis,
as the source of the quote in Wauconda). Under the facts of that case, the Court ruled that, “in
effect,” a taking occurred because the challenged statute transferred a fundamental attribute away
from one property owner to another. Id., 142 Wash. 2d at 370, 13 P.3d at 194.
83. No. CV-09-0070-FVS, 2010 WL 816727 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2010).
84. Heitman v. City of Spokane Valley, No. CV-09-0070-FVS, 2010 WL 816727, at *4–6 (E.D.
Wash. Mar. 5, 2010).
85. 482 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2007), aff’d sub nom. McGlung v. City of Sumner, 548
F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2765 (2009).
86. Tapps Brewing, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1228–32. Although the property owners appealed the
district court decision, they did not seek appellate review of their state law claims. See McGlung,
548 F.3d at 1223 n.1. The Washington takings analysis has remained a mistaken attempt to track
federal law under the U.S. Constitution; it has never been an application of unique Washington
constitutional protections. See infra text accompanying notes 111–22, 228–29, and 269–72.
87. Tapps Brewing, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–32.
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latter are an integral part of the former.88 The threshold questions
determine which challenged actions must go through a takings challenge
(including the Penn Central factors) and which need not.89
The Washington Court of Appeals also has attempted to apply the
Washington takings analysis since 199390 and, to no surprise, has been
confused by the analysis. The court expressed its frustration most
pointedly in its 1995 decision in Guimont v. City of Seattle
(Guimont II),91 a case involving the same parties as, but legal issues
distinct from, the case that resulted in the Washington State Supreme
Court’s 1993 Guimont I decision.92 In attempting to recite the takings
analysis, Guimont II mistakenly included the “fundamental attribute of
property ownership” element twice, forcing the court of appeals to
search unsuccessfully for “a clue to the distinction” in this repetition.93
Guimont II considered whether repetition of the element could have been
caused by distinctions among the verbs “destroy,” “derogate,” and
“infringe,” but the court ultimately rejected that as the reason and
abandoned the search.94
As testament to the confusion surrounding Washington’s takings law,
the Washington Court of Appeals in Peste v. Mason County95
subsequently misread Guimont II’s unsuccessful search for a clue as a
success.96 Peste not only followed Guimont II’s mistaken repetition of
the “fundamental attribute” element, but also recited as settled law what
Guimont II merely considered but rejected as a reason for the repetition:

88. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 595–96, 854 P.2d at 6 (explaining that government action
susceptible to a “takings challenge” is subject to application of the Penn Central factors, even if not
identifying them as such).
89. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594, 854 P.2d at 5.
90. Peste v. Mason Cnty., 133 Wash. App. 456, 471–74, 136 P.3d 140, 148–49 (2006); City of
Des Moines v. Gray Buss., LLC, 130 Wash. App. 600, 611–15, 124 P.3d 324, 330–32 (2005);
Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 767–74, 102 P.3d 173, 177–81 (2004);
Edmonds Shopping Ctr. Assocs. v. City of Edmonds, 117 Wash. App. 344, 362–64, 71 P.3d 233,
241–42 (2003); Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground, 115 Wash. App. 752, 770–72, 63 P.3d 142, 152–
53 (2002); City of Seattle v. McCoy, 101 Wash. App. 815, 827–39, 4 P.3d 159, 166–72 (2000);
Kahuna Land Co. v. Spokane Cnty., 94 Wash. App. 836, 841–43, 974 P.2d 1250, 1252–53 (1999);
Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Smitch, 87 Wash. App. 27, 32–38, 940 P.2d 274, 276–80 (1997); Guimont
v. City of Seattle (Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 79–86, 896 P.2d 70, 75–79 (1995); Jones v. King
Cnty., 74 Wash. App. 467, 478–79, 874 P.2d 853, 859 (1994).
91. 77 Wash. App. 74, 896 P.2d 70 (1995).
92. See id. at 77–78, 896 P.2d at 75 (distinguishing Guimont I).
93. Id. at 80–81 & n.6, 896 P.2d at 76 & n.6.
94. Id.
95. 133 Wash. App. 456, 471–74, 136 P.3d 140, 148–49 (2006)
96. Peste, 133 Wash. App. at 472–73, 136 P.3d at 148–49.
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distinctions between “infringe” and “destroy.”97 Given the complexity of
the Washington analysis, such confusion should not be surprising.
Guimont II’s critique of the Washington analysis went further.
Beyond its confusion over its mistaken repetition of the “fundamental
attribute” element, Guimont II also could not determine “where the
analysis goes if a regulation does not effect a ‘total taking’ or ‘physical
invasion’ but does implicate a fundamental attribute of property
ownership.”98 The court ultimately decided that, under the facts of that
case, it could “leave this conundrum to another day.”99 With perceptible
relief, Guimont II noted that “this case does not require us to completely
rehash the complex, confusing and often-ethereal realm of theoretical
law that has developed in Washington under the taking clause of the 5th
and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.”100 Aptly
recognizing what would be involved in trying to untangle the
Washington takings analysis, Guimont II confessed “we have no desire
to add more heat to the discussion at the expense of light . . . .”101
Because attorneys must advise their clients in advance of any
litigation, they frequently struggle with the Washington takings analysis.
This is especially true of attorneys for local governments. The
Washington Growth Management Act (GMA)102 embraces a number of
land use planning goals to guide the development of local
comprehensive plans and development regulations.103 Among those
goals is one that parrots the Federal Takings Clause: “Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation having been
made.”104 Local governments can face litigation to overturn
comprehensive plan or development regulation amendments on the
ground that local governments adopted them without first evaluating the
97. Id. at 472–73, 136 P.3d at 149; cf. Guimont II, 77 Wash. App. at 81 n.6, 896 P.2d at 76 n.6.
98. Guimont II, 77 Wash. App. at 85 n.9, 896 P.2d at 78 n.9 (emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 85 n.9, 896 P.2d at 78 n.9.
100. Id. at 79, 896 P.2d at 75–76.
101. Id. at 80, 896 P.2d at 76.
102. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.010–.903 (2010).
103. Those goals include the reduction of urban sprawl, the encouragement of affordable housing
and economic development, and the preservation of historic resources. Id. § 36.70A.020(2), (4), (5),
(13). A comprehensive plan is a “generalized coordinated land use policy statement of the
governing body of a county or city.” Id. § 36.70A.030(4). Development regulations are “the controls
placed on development or land use activities by a county or city.” Id. § 36.70A.030(7). The GMA
requires counties with populations above a certain size, and the cities within those counties, to
“adopt a comprehensive plan under [the GMA] and development regulations that are consistent with
and implement the comprehensive plan.” Id. § 36.70A.040(3)(d).
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(6) (2010); accord U.S. CONST. amend. V: “[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
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amendments’ potential to take property unconstitutionally.105 To help
local governments meet this procedural requirement to subject almost
every piece of local land use legislation to a takings analysis, the GMA
directs Washington’s Attorney General to establish an “orderly,
consistent process, including a checklist if appropriate, that better
enables . . . local governments to evaluate proposed regulatory or
administrative actions to assure that such actions do not result in an
unconstitutional taking of private property.”106 Unfortunately, the
Attorney General’s process does little more than prompt local
governments to consider the elements of the convoluted Washington
takings analysis.107 Like others’ good faith attempts to explain the
Washington analysis as black letter law,108 the Attorney General’s

105. The Growth Management Hearings Boards have initial jurisdiction over claims that a local
comprehensive plan or development regulation amendment violates the GMA. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 36.70A.280 (2010); see generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.250–36.70A.330 (2010)
(provisions related to the Board). Although the Washington Legislature recently ordered the various
boards to consolidate, they remained three separate entities, each with jurisdiction over a distinct
region of Washington, during the first two decades of the GMA’s existence. Compare Act of July
16, 1991, ch. 32, § 5, 1991 Wash. Sess. Laws 2903, 2907 (initial establishment of the Western
Washington, Central Puget Sound, and Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Boards),
with Act of Mar. 25, 2010, ch. 211, § 17, 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1679, 1697–98 (recent
consolidation). All of the boards agreed that the GMA provides a cause of action to enforce the
GMA’s takings goal through a procedural requirement that local governments must give
“appropriate” or “adequate” consideration to whether comprehensive plan and development
regulation amendments might effect a taking. See, e.g., Shulman v. City of Bellevue, No. 95-30076, 1996 WL 681286, at *7 (Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearing Bd. May 13, 1996);
Achen v. Clark Cnty., No. 95-2-0067c, 1995 WL 903178, at *6 (W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearing
Bd. Sept. 20, 1995).
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.370(1) (2010). Although the GMA orders local governments to
use the Attorney General’s process, WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.370(2) (2010), the GMA makes
clear that it does not “grant[] a private party the right to seek judicial relief requiring compliance”
with that requirement. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.370(4) (2010) (emphasis added). Nevertheless,
the formerly distinct Growth Management Hearings Boards disagreed on whether a private party
could seek a board order to force a local government to comply with the Attorney General’s
process. Compare Shulman, 1996 WL 681286, at *11 (no cause of action), and Wilma v. Stevens
Cnty., No. 06-1-0009c, 2007 WL 1153336, at *24 (E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearing Bd. Mar. 12,
2007) (same), with Laurel Park Cmty., LLC v. City of Tumwater, No. 09-2-0010, 2009 WL
3844487, at *10–12 (W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearing Bd. Oct. 13, 2009) (finding that a city failed
to comply with the Attorney General’s process).
107. AG MEMO, supra note 43, at 13–16 (advising the use of “warning signals” that are
essentially the questions posed by the various elements of the Washington takings analysis).
108. See, e.g., Spencer, Regulatory Taking, supra note 43, § 110.4 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2002);
Timothy H. Butler, Presentation at Government Takings Seminar: Overview of State Regulatory
Takings Law (Nov. 15, 2001).
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largely uncritical summary of the analysis risks misstatement,
oversimplification, and loss of critical detail.109
In sum, the Washington takings analysis vexes anyone trying to
understand and apply it. Despite the Washington State Supreme Court’s
declaration two decades ago that it had delivered Washington takings
law from its quagmire,110 the Washington analysis continues to mire
those who venture into it.
II.

THE WASHINGTON TAKINGS ANALYSIS IS UNFOUNDED

If complexity were its only vice, there would be little justification for
criticizing the Washington takings analysis. Law does not have to be
simple.
But law should be well-founded. The Washington takings analysis is
unfounded on at least three levels. First, the Washington analysis is
fatally undermined by the fact that it differs from the analysis
established by the U.S. Supreme Court, which must remain the ultimate
arbiter of how courts apply federal constitutional protections. Second,
the Washington analysis is constitutionally insufficient because it
enhances protections for government and thus necessarily lowers the
floor of protection set for property owners by the federal analysis.
Finally, each of the elements unique to the Washington analysis offers
little value or has been discredited by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A.

Differences Between the Washington and Federal Takings
Analyses Fatally Undermine the Washington Analysis

The Washington State Supreme Court created the Washington
analysis as an interpretation of the Takings Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The Court believed that it successfully coordinated the
Washington and federal analyses of that provision. The Court was
mistaken. The analyses are decidedly different. That fact alone is a fatal
flaw of the Washington analysis.
Understanding how the Court committed this error requires a review
of the decisions that built the unique Washington analysis from 1987
109. See, e.g., AG MEMO, supra note 43, at 7–10 (recognizing few differences between the
Washington and federal analyses). This is not meant as a criticism of the Attorney General’s
memorandum, which is a laudable attempt to comply with the GMA’s directive to assist local
governments. The Attorney General is not at liberty to change the Washington takings analysis, and
the Attorney General’s memorandum is not an appropriate platform from which to urge reform of
that analysis.
110. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 328, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990).
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through 1993. Decided in 1987, Orion Corp. v. State111 devoted pages to
discussing the Court’s view of how Washington takings case law had
departed from elusive and ambiguous federal case law.112 Orion
ultimately decided to follow the federal takings analysis: “[I]n order to
avoid exacerbating the confusion surrounding the regulatory takings
doctrine, and because the federal approach may in some instance provide
broader protection, we will apply the federal analysis to review all
regulatory takings claims, including Orion’s.”113 By then relying
primarily on federal case law to review the claim before it,114 Orion not
only rendered its discussion of the unique Washington approach dictum,
but also declared that approach to be different from, and less desirable
than, the federal analysis.
Having identified and then rejected a unique Washington approach in
Orion, the Court appropriately hewed to federal law three months later
when it next faced a takings claim in Allingham v. City of Seattle.115 For
the recitation of the takings analysis in that decision, the Court cited only
a federal takings decision and a 1968 Washington decision that did not
actually involve a takings claim.116 As originally issued, Allingham did
not even cite Orion.117
111. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
112. Id. at 645–53, 747 P.2d at 1075–79.
113. Id. at 657, 747 P.2d at 1082.
114. Id. at 658–66, 670–71, 747 P.2d at 1082–86, 1088.
115. 109 Wash. 2d 947, 952–53, 749 P.2d 160, 163–64, modified, 757 P.2d 533 (1988), overruled
in part on other grounds by Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335, 787 P.2d at 915.
116. Id. at 952, 749 P.2d at 163 (“A zoning ordinance constitutes a taking of private property
where it (1) does not substantially promote legitimate public interests, or (2) deprives the owner of
any profitable use of the land.” (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260–61, (1980); Carlson v.
Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 41, 51, 435 P.2d 957 (1968))). Although the U.S. Supreme Court
subsequently removed Agins and the “substantially promotes legitimate public interests” element
from the federal takings analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 20–31 (discussing Lingle), that
element was part of the federal analysis when Allingham was decided in 1988. To the extent that
Carlson touched upon takings law, it recited federal authority. See Carlson, 73 Wash. 2d at 44–45,
435 P.2d at 959 (invoking federal law similar to what became the Penn Central factors to resolve a
challenge to an exercise of “legislative discretion” under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of
review).
117. Although inconsistent with the proper distinction between due process claims (for which
invalidation is the proper constitutional remedy) and takings claims (for which compensation is the
proper constitutional remedy), see supra text accompanying notes 5–8, the plaintiffs in Allingham
successfully pressed a takings claim to seek invalidation of the challenged land use regulation, not
compensation for application of that regulation. Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at 948, 953, 749 P.2d at
161, 164. Perhaps aware of this inconsistency, the Washington State Supreme Court later modified
Allingham to add a two-sentence footnote, one sentence of which cited Orion generally for the
following statement: “The remedy we grant of invalidation of the ordinance is a remedy consistent
with the denial of substantive due process.” 757 P.2d at 534 (Order Changing the Opinion). This
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In 1990, the Court compounded the confusion it sought to avoid in
Orion. In Presbytery of Seattle v. King County,118 the Court explained
that it was considering “the ‘taking’ analysis used by the United States
Supreme Court and by this court in Orion.” 119 On its face, this statement
could refer only to the federal takings analysis because Orion applied
federal case law in lieu of a unique Washington analysis.120 But that is
apparently not what Presbytery meant. Presbytery displayed no
appreciation of the fact that Orion abandoned a Washington takings
analysis in favor of the federal analysis. Instead of reading Orion as
having chosen between a federal and a Washington analysis, Presbytery
cast Orion as having “coordinated” both analyses into the start of a
“comprehensive formula” for resolving takings challenges.121 To
improve that coordinated, federal-state formula, Presbytery devoted six
pages to converting the unique Washington approach described in Orion
into a formal, multi-part analysis through citations to both federal and
Washington case law.122
Despite deriving a “comprehensive formula” from Orion and thereby
radically recasting Orion’s true lesson, Presbytery did not actually apply
that formula or any other takings analysis because the Court resolved
Presbytery not on takings grounds, but on ripeness grounds.123 This
crucial juncture in Washington’s takings law—where the Washington
State Supreme Court formally articulated a unique analysis on the
mistaken assumption that it was coordinating Washington and federal
law—therefore arose in dictum.124

was likely a reference to Orion’s discussion of the respective remedies available for takings and due
process violations. See Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 649, 747 P.2d at 1077.
The Washington State Supreme Court later overruled Allingham in part, not because it invoked
federal takings law instead of Orion’s summary of Washington takings law, but because Allingham
misapplied federal law on the question of whether the entire parcel of property must be considered
when determining whether a taking has occurred. See Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114
Wash. 2d 320, 335, 787 P.2d 907, 915 (1990).
118. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990).
119. Id. at 333, 787 P.2d at 914.
120. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 658–66, 670–71, 747 P.2d 1062, 1082–86,
1088 (1987).
121. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 328, 787 P.2d at 912.
122. Id. at 329–30, 333–37, 787 P.2d at 912, 914–16.
123. Compare id. at 327, 787 P.2d at 911 (explaining in a “Prefatory Note” why the Court felt
compelled to explore takings law even though the Court ultimately resolved the case on ripeness
grounds), with id. at 337–40, 787 P.2d at 916–18 (resolution of the case).
124. Accord Jeffrey M. Eustis, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Growth Management Act
Implementation That Avoids Takings and Substantive Due Process Limitations, 16 U. PUGET
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Two years later, in 1992, when faced with its next pair of takings
cases—Sintra v. City of Seattle (Sintra I)125 and Robinson v. City of
Seattle126—the Court welcomed its first opportunity to apply the
coordinated analysis it had heralded in Presbytery: “This court’s recent
opinions in [Orion and Presbytery] have formulated a comprehensive
state ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine. Thus, this State’s current rule on the
law of inverse condemnation has only recently taken shape, and [the new
pair of cases present] opportunities for this court to apply [its] recently
adopted analysis.”127 Sintra I and Robinson embraced Presbytery’s
assumption that the Court had coordinated the federal and Washington
takings analyses into a seamless whole in which federal and Washington
authority coexist without friction.128 Both cases presented claims solely
under the U.S. Constitution.129 The Court noted that “[s]tate law may
provide useful guidance in this determination, but federal law is
ultimately controlling.”130 Nevertheless, the Court followed its
Presbytery dictum (which incorrectly equated the Washington takings
analysis with the federal takings analysis) rather than its Orion dictum
(which cast the Washington analysis as different from, and less desirable
than, the federal analysis).131
The following year, in 1993, the Court tinkered with the Washington
analysis in another pair of decisions, both of which underscored the
Court’s mistaken assumption that it had successfully blended
Washington and federal takings law. First, in Guimont v. Clarke
(Guimont I),132 the Court modified Presbytery’s description of the
Washington analysis to incorporate the “total [regulatory] taking”
element that the U.S. Supreme Court added to the federal analysis in

SOUND L. REV. 1181, 1191–92 (1993) (recognizing that Presbytery’s framework “was largely set
forth in dicta”).
125. 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765 (1992).
126. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318 (1992).
127. Id., 119 Wash. 2d at 47–48, 830 P.2d at 327. As it turned out, the Court was able to take
advantage of that opportunity only in Robinson. Because the Court dismissed Sintra I as unripe, it
did not apply a takings analysis, but instead discussed it only as dictum. Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at
18–20, 829 P.2d at 774–76.
128. See, e.g., Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 13–14, 829 P.2d at 772 (“In Presbytery . . . this court
clarified regulatory takings analysis and made plain the necessary steps to show that a taking had
occurred.”).
129. Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 14, 829 P.2d at 772; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 47, 830 P.2d at
327.
130. Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 14, 829 P.2d at 772.
131. Id. at 13–18, 829 P.2d at 771–74; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49–54, 830 P.2d at 327–30.
132. 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993).
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1992.133 Guimont I applied “only the federal constitution” and, in
determining whether a taking had occurred in that case, cited far more
federal authority than it cited Presbytery or other Washington case
law.134 Finally, in Margola Associates v. City of Seattle,135 the Court
recited the Washington analysis as newly modified by Guimont I
(dubbing it the “revised Presbytery analysis”),136 and then cited federal
case law almost exclusively to find that no taking occurred.137
At least two weaknesses emerge from the six-year evolution of the
Washington takings analysis. One relatively minor weakness stems from
the circumstances of its birth: its origins in dicta should undercut its
precedential value.138
The other weakness is fatal: the existence of differences between the
Washington and federal takings analyses. When, as here, the
Washington State Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution, the
Court is not free to substitute its own analysis for that of the U.S.
Supreme Court, which “acts as the final arbiter of controversies arising
under the federal constitution.”139 Although the Washington State
Supreme Court articulated this axiom in a different context, its words
apply to a present-day analysis of takings claims:
These questions . . . are by no means novel; they have often been
raised, and the supreme court [of the United States] has often
considered them, as an analysis of its cases will readily reveal. It
scarcely needs be said that, with respect to matters involving the
Federal constitution, we, as an inferior tribunal, must follow the
pronouncements of that court no matter what our private views
may be.140

133. Id. at 594–604, 854 P.2d at 5–11 (incorporating Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992)). For a discussion of the role Lucas plays in the federal takings analysis, see supra text
accompanying notes 36–37.
134. Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d at 604–08, 854 P.2d at 11–13.
135. 121 Wash. 2d 625, 854 P.2d 23 (1993).
136. Id. at 642–46, 854 P.2d at 33–35.
137. Id. at 646–49, 854 P.2d at 35–36. The Washington Court of Appeals appears to accept the
notion that the Washington and federal takings analyses are equivalent. That court has frequently
applied the Washington analysis only after noting that federal takings law must control. E.g.,
Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Smitch, 87 Wash. App. 27, 33–35, 940 P.2d 274, 277–78 (1997); Guimont
v. City of Seattle (Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 79 n.4, 896 P.2d 70, 75 n.4 (1995).
138. See Malted Mousse, Inc. v. Steinmetz, 150 Wash. 2d 518, 531–32, 79 P.3d 1154, 1161
(2003) (applying this reasoning to undercut other Washington State Supreme Court precedent).
139. State v. Laviollette, 118 Wash. 2d 670, 673–74, 826 P.2d 684, 686 (1992).
140. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. State, 38 Wash. 2d 663, 676, 231 P.2d 325, 332 (1951).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise reeled in state courts that attempt
to apply a federal constitutional provision in a manner contrary to an
established federal analysis.141
Through its frequent consideration of takings claims, the U.S.
Supreme Court has articulated a comprehensive federal takings analysis.
Although the Washington State Supreme Court assumed it was
coordinating the Washington and federal analyses from Presbytery
through Margola, that assumption was incorrect then and remains
incorrect today. As a glance at the flow charts representing the two
analyses reveals,142 the federal and Washington takings analyses are,
without doubt, different. The existence of those differences—even if one
thought that they improved upon the federal analysis—cripples the
Washington analysis. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has dictated the
steps a court must take when analyzing a takings claim, the Washington
State Supreme Court must follow those steps. Its failure to yield to the
superior tribunal fundamentally undermines the Washington takings
analysis.
B.

The Washington Takings Analysis Grew from an Illusory Premise
into a Constitutionally Insufficient Substitute for the Federal
Analysis

Although the existence of differences between the Washington and
federal takings analyses should provide an adequate basis for discarding
the Washington analysis, an additional reason lies in the motivation for,
and constitutional implications of, those differences. They stem from a
premise that has proved unstable and led to a Washington analysis that is
constitutionally insufficient because it offers individuals fewer
opportunities to prevail on a takings claim than under the federal
analysis.
1.

The Washington Analysis Is Structured on a Police-Power-orEminent-Domain Dichotomy and a Desire to Enhance Protections
for Local Governments

A unique and central feature of the Washington takings analysis is the
prominent role substantive due process plays in shielding government
from monetary damages. This feature is rooted in a line of cases that

141. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375–76 (1979); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 719–20, 719 n.4 (1975).
142. See supra figures following notes 41 and 44.
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repeat a simple-sounding dichotomy: a regulation must be evaluated as
an exercise of either the police power under due process law or the
power of eminent domain under takings law.143 Because these cases
paint the picture of two mutually exclusive categories, an action that is a
valid exercise of the police power cannot also be a taking.
The police-power-or-eminent-domain dichotomy grew from a
nineteenth century U.S. Supreme Court decision, Mugler v. Kansas,144
which observed that “[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
deemed a taking . . . .”145 Over three decades later, in its 1921 decision in
Conger v. Pierce County,146 the Washington State Supreme Court relied
on that statement to formulate Washington’s police-power-or-eminentdomain dichotomy: “Eminent domain takes private property for a public
use, while the police power regulates its use and enjoyment, or if it takes
or damages it, it is not a taking or damaging for the public use, but to
conserve the safety, morals, health and general welfare of the public.”147
143. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Pierce Cnty., 148 Wash. 2d 760, 767–68, 64 P.3d 618, 623 (2002)
(“Courts have long looked behind labels to determine whether a particular exercise of power was
properly characterized as police power or eminent domain.”); Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty.,
114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990) (“These two constitutional theories are
alternatives in cases where overly severe land use regulations are alleged,” so in each case, the court
must “determine which of these two constitutional tests to utilize”); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash.
2d 621, 646, 650–51, 747 P.2d 1062, 1075–76, 1078 (1987); Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n v. State, 97
Wash. 2d 466, 476, 647 P.2d 481, 486 (1982) (“It is a well established principle that if a regulation
is a valid exercise of the State’s police powers, it does not constitute a taking.”); Rains v. Dep’t of
Fisheries, 89 Wash. 2d 740, 745, 575 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1978) (“The critical determination under this
constitutional provision is between a ‘taking’ and a regulation or restriction on the use of private
property in the public interest, which is deemed to be a valid exercise of the police power of the
State for which there is no right to compensation.”); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology,
88 Wash. 2d 726, 731, 565 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1977) (casting the issue as whether the government’s
action “is a taking or damaging of private property for public use in violation of [the Washington
State] Const. art. 1, § 16, and the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, or whether the
prohibition is a valid exercise of the state police power.”); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d
400, 408, 348 P.2d 664, 669 (1960) (“The difficulty arises in deciding whether a restriction is an
exercise of the police power or an exercise of the eminent domain power.”), overruled on other
grounds by Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wash. 2d 6, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976);
Conger v. Pierce Cnty., 116 Wash. 27, 36, 198 P. 377, 380 (1921); City of Des Moines v. Gray
Buss., LLC, 130 Wash. App. 600, 608, 124 P.3d 324, 328 (2005) (“The threshold question in any
taking claim is whether the government action is an exercise of its eminent domain power or its
police power.”); see also Stanley H. Barer, Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from Police
Power and Tort, 38 WASH. L. REV. 607 (1963).
144. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
145. Id. at 668–69.
146. 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921).
147. Id. at 36, 198 P. at 380.
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Subsequent Washington decisions recited the dichotomy as settled law,
pointing to Mugler or Conger.148
This line of authority collided with a separate line of federal case law
that began in 1922, just one year after Washington embraced the policepower-or-eminent-domain dichotomy in Conger. In Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,149 the U.S. Supreme Court offered what eventually
became an axiom of federal takings law: “The general rule at least is that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”150 This axiom left courts asking
how a governmental action could simultaneously be: (1) both an exercise
of the police power and a taking, as suggested by Pennsylvania Coal;
and (2) only an exercise of the police power or the eminent domain
power—but not both—as suggested by Mugler.
The Washington takings analysis emerged from an effort to resolve
this apparent conundrum. Orion took stock of how Washington courts
had addressed this question. Orion cast Mugler and its progeny as
holding that “an exercise of the police power protective of the public,
health, safety, or welfare cannot be a taking requiring compensation”
and concluded that the tension between that holding and Pennsylvania
Coal rendered federal takings law ambiguous.151 The Court believed that
this ambiguity left local governments uncertain about whether their land
use regulations would be deemed a taking (for which compensation
would necessarily be required) or a violation of due process (for which
the remedy was mere invalidation of the regulation).152 Orion warned
that the risk of paying compensation for a takings claim chills needed
land use regulations:

148. See, e.g., Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 646, 747 P.2d at 1075; Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n, 97
Wash. 2d at 476, 647 P.2d at 486–87; Rains, 89 Wash. 2d at 745, 575 P.2d at 1059; Maple Leaf
Investors, 88 Wash. 2d at 732–33, 565 P.2d at 1165; Ackerman, 55 Wash. 2d at 408, 348 P.2d at
669.
149. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
150. Id. at 415; see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (describing this
aspect of Pennsylvania Coal as a “watershed” in federal takings decisions).
151. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 645–46, 747 P.2d at 1075. Academic articles in the 1980s and early
1990s also described the tension between Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal. See, e.g., Stoebuck, supra
note 61, at 1059–63, 1079 (casting Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal as being “hopelessly at odds”
and “poles apart”); Ross A. Macfarlane, Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity of Land Use
Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 WASH. L.
REV. 715, 723 (1982) (concluding that the conflict between the two cases was never resolved); John
M. Groen & Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas, and the Growth Management Act, 16 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1259, 1262 (1993) (“[T]his unresolved tension [between these two
decisions] has been a source of much confusion and misinterpretation.”).
152. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 649, 747 P.2d at 1077.
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[C]hoosing to invoke the takings analysis instead of the due
process test will necessarily trigger the specter of financial
liability. If all excessive regulations require just compensation,
rather than invalidation, land-use decision makers, who adopt
regulations in a good faith attempt to prevent a public harm, will
nevertheless be held strictly liable for regulations that result in a
taking. Undoubtedly, the specter of strict financial liability will
intimidate legislative bodies from making the difficult, but
necessary choices presented by the most sensitive environmental
land-use problems.153
To resolve this apparent problem, Washington courts shielded local
government from the specter of takings claims by effectively giving
government the opportunity to cop a plea: to absorb a disappointing
substantive due process loss that would at least preclude an expensive
takings loss. According to Orion, Washington courts did this to resolve
the tension in federal law in favor of Mugler and the police-power-oreminent-domain dichotomy it spawned:
We have long recognized a conceptual difference between a
“taking” by eminent domain, which takes property for public
use, and the exercise of the police power, which limits the
landowner’s use to “conserve the safety, morals, health and
general welfare of the public.” In so doing, we have reflected the
position adopted by the [U.S.] Supreme Court in Mugler, where
the Court stated that a prohibition on injurious uses must be
tested not under principles governing eminent domain, but rather
under the due process guaranty.154
Orion recognized that this position put Washington at odds with
federal law: “Certain aspects of our state regulatory takings doctrine
appear to conflict with federal analysis. We believe whatever differences
exist result from our willingness to expressly recognize the role of
substantive due process.”155 Orion decided not to follow prior
Washington takings case law precisely because that law had departed
from federal law. Instead, Orion applied the federal takings analysis to

153. Id.
154. Id. at 650, 747 P.2d at 1078 (citations omitted); accord Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking
Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now You Don’t, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 339, 368–
69 (1989) (noting that the difference in remedies to be applied motivated Orion “to make a precise
determination of the relative applicability of due process and taking limitations”); Stoebuck, supra
note 61, at 1097 (advocating use of substantive due process and its remedy as an “escape hatch”
against takings claims).
155. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 657, 747 P.2d at 1081.
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reduce confusion and because the federal analysis might actually provide
individuals broader protection.156
That point was lost on the Washington State Supreme Court in its
subsequent decisions that formulated the current Washington takings
analysis.157 From Presbytery through Margola, the Court mistakenly
assumed that Orion had harmonized Washington and federal takings
law.158 That mistake committed Washington courts to a takings analysis
premised on the Mugler police-power-or-eminent-domain dichotomy
and structured around a prominent role for substantive due process to
shield government from monetary damages.
The unique “threshold questions” at the heart of the Washington
analysis manifest the goal—articulated but rejected in Orion—of
diverting takings claims into due process analyses where possible. The
Washington State Supreme Court employs the “threshold questions”
specifically “[t]o determine which of these constitutional tests to
utilize”—takings or substantive due process.159 One of those questions
asks whether the challenged regulation seeks less to prevent a harm than
to impose the requirement of providing an affirmative public benefit.160
Under the Washington takings analysis, a negative answer to that
question is tantamount to a finding that the action is intended primarily
to prevent a harm and must therefore constitute an exercise of the police
power susceptible only to a due process challenge, not a takings
challenge.161 The Washington State Supreme Court likewise casts a
156. Id. at 657, 747 P.2d at 1082.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 118–37 (discussing how the Washington takings analysis
evolved from Presbytery through Margola).
158. Id. Orion determined that Washington case law had sided with Mugler over Pennsylvania
Coal. See Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 650, 747 P.2d at 1078. Nevertheless, Orion reported that
Washington had somehow harmonized those decisions: “By harmonizing Pennsylvania Coal and
Mugler, our case law implicitly recognized a dividing line between land-use regulations that deprive
property rights with due process and land-use regulations that go one step further to effect a
compensable taking.” Id. at 651, 747 P.2d at 1078. In reality, Pennsylvania Coal and Mugler cannot
be harmonized. Pennsylvania Coal has supplanted Mugler. See infra text accompanying notes 164–
77; see also Eustis, supra note 124, at 1189–97 (criticizing how Washington case law “has run
takings and substantive due process analyses together”).
159. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990);
accord Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 593–94, 854 P.2d 1, 5 (1993).
160. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594–95, 600, 603 & n.5, 854 P.2d at 6, 9, 10 & n.5; Robinson v.
City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49, 53, 830 P.2d 318, 328, 330 (1992); Sintra v. City of Seattle
(Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 14–16, 829 P.2d 765, 772–73 (1992).
161. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594–95, 854 P.2d at 6; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–30, 787
P.2d at 912; accord AG MEMO, supra note 43, at 9 (“When government regulation has the effect of
appropriating private property for a public benefit rather than to prevent some harm, it may be the
functional equivalent of the exercise of eminent domain.”).
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negative answer to the other threshold question—whether the regulation
infringes on a fundamental attribute of property ownership—as
potentially freeing the regulation from a takings challenge, even if the
regulation might still face a substantive due process challenge.162
Presbytery left no doubt that the Washington takings analysis would, by
design, result in takings claims being diverted into a substantive due
process analysis:
No compensation (which properly belongs with a “taking”
analysis) is warranted in the face of a due process violation.
Invalidation of the ordinance (instead of compensation) also
avoids intimidating the legislative body . . . . Accordingly, many
challenges to land use regulations will most appropriately be
analyzed under a due process formula rather than under a
“taking” formula.163
Structuring Washington’s takings analysis around substantive due
process law allowed the Washington State Supreme Court to relieve the
perceived tension between Mugler (and its supposed holding that a valid
exercise of the police power cannot be a taking) and Pennsylvania Coal
(and its observation that an exercise of the police power can be a taking
if it goes “too far”). Downplaying Pennsylvania Coal, the Court used the
Mugler-inspired police-power-or-eminent-domain dichotomy to build a
takings escape hatch for government.
2.

The Police-Power-or-Eminent-Domain Dichotomy Is Illusory

The problem with designing a takings analysis to relieve the tension
between Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal is that no such tension exists.
Pennsylvania Coal controls. No takings analysis should be structured
around Mugler or its supposed police-power-or-eminent-domain
dichotomy.
Mugler is effectively a dead letter for three reasons. First, Mugler’s
brief diversion into takings law is weak precedent. Mugler neither cited
nor mentioned the Fifth Amendment—the source of federal takings
protections. Instead, Mugler dealt solely with a due process challenge
raised under the Fourteenth Amendment by a brewer who unsuccessfully
162. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603–04, 854 P.2d at 10–11; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–
30, 787 P.2d at 912. A negative answer to this question is not sufficient to avoid a takings claim
under the Washington takings analysis; only negative answers to both threshold questions provides
a shield from a takings claim. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 595, 854 P.2d at 6 (describing the
Presbytery version of the analysis); id. at 603–04, 854 P.2d at 10–11 (describing what remains in
the current version).
163. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 332–33, 787 P.2d at 913–14.
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challenged a law that banned the brewing of beer.164 Mugler discussed
takings only because the brewer premised an argument on Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co.,165 which involved a takings claim under the Wisconsin
Constitution.166 Pumpelly dealt with the permanent flooding of land by
the government that deprived the owner of all uses of the land.167 Mugler
distinguished Pumpelly’s takings holding because it had “no application
to the [due process] case under consideration” in Mugler.168 Mugler’s
treatment of Pumpelly could have ended there. Nevertheless, in what is
arguably dictum, Mugler then offered the sentence that continues to
reverberate in Washington takings law: “A prohibition simply upon the
use of property for purposes that are declared . . . to be
injurious . . . cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking . . . for the
public benefit.”169 Later in that same paragraph, in a sentence generally
overlooked in Washington law, Mugler clarified that it was
distinguishing government action that merely prevents a particular use
while allowing other uses: “prohibition of [property’s] use in a particular
way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from
taking property for public use . . . .”170 Read in context, Mugler simply
noted that the facts of Pumpelly—where government flooding destroyed
land for all purposes—rendered it inapplicable to a brewing-ban claim,
where the government was prohibiting the use of property only for a
particular purpose. Put another way, Mugler presented a fact pattern
that, had it actually been challenged as a taking in federal court today,
would have been deemed to be a regulation that did not go far enough to

164. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657 (1887); accord id. at 657–64. Even as due process
precedent, Mugler carries little weight. As recounted by the Washington State Supreme Court
roughly a dozen years before Orion, Mugler was part of the now-abandoned era in which the U.S.
Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause to strike down government regulations. Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Wash. Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 83 Wash. 2d 523, 531–34, 520 P.2d 162, 168–69
(1974). Aetna Life reported that “[t]he judicial intrusion of the due process clause upon a state’s
police power reached its acme in Mugler . . . where the court defined the police power as embracing
no more than the power to promote public health, morals and safety.” Id. at 532, 520 P.2d at 168.
Concluding its history lesson, Aetna Life noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s due process
jurisprudence had come “full circle” by the middle of the twentieth century by repudiating cases like
Mugler. Id. at 533–34, 520 P.2d at 169.
165. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872).
166. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667–68.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 668.
169. Id. at 668–69 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 669.
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constitute a taking under the rationale of Pennsylvania Coal.171 There is,
in short, no tension between Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal on the
question of what may constitute a taking.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court does not recognize any tension
between Mugler’s diversion into takings law and Pennsylvania Coal’s
announcement that a police power regulation may constitute a taking if it
goes “too far.” Indeed, had there been any tension between the two
decisions, one would expect Pennsylvania Coal to have distinguished
Mugler. Yet Pennsylvania Coal did not even cite Mugler.172
Finally, to the extent there might have been tension between Mugler
and Pennsylvania Coal, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved it in favor of
Pennsylvania Coal. In its 1992 Lucas decision,173 the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected an argument that Mugler provided a police-power shield
against takings claims. Lucas reversed a lower court that relied on
Mugler to conclude incorrectly that a valid exercise of the police
power—no matter the severity of its impact on the property owner—
could not be deemed a taking.174 The Court held that a government
deprivation of “all economically beneficial uses,” even if in pursuit of a
valid exercise of the police power, constitutes a taking, except to the
extent that “background principles of nuisance and property law”
independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property.175
According to Lucas, the facts of Mugler presented just one example of a
case where a valid police power regulation merely affected property
values without depriving the owner of all economically beneficial
uses.176 In its 2005 Lingle decision, which rid the federal takings analysis
171. In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that, unlike other cases, Mugler involved only the
“prohibition upon use of a building as a brewery; other uses [were] permitted.” Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 n.13 (1992).
172. One scholar speculated that the author of Pennsylvania Coal was aware of Mugler, even
though Pennsylvania Coal did not cite Mugler. Macfarlane, supra note 151, at 723 n.54.
173. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
174. See id. at 1009–10, 1020–22.
175. Id. at 1019, 1026–32.
176. Id. at 1022, 1026 n.13. Just a year after Lucas was announced, two scholars recognized it as
Mugler’s death knell. Groen & Stephens, supra note 151, at 1284–85. Time has validated their
pronouncement: the only relevant post-Lucas citation made by a U.S. Supreme Court justice to
Mugler was in a dissenting opinion that cited both Lucas and Mugler to support the proposition that
takings and due process analyses are distinct. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 519–20
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Another scholar credited First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)—decided five years before Lucas—as “explicitly rejecting”
Mugler. Settle, supra note 154, at 353, 375. This is incorrect. To the contrary, First English
expressly noted that it had “no occasion to decide” the relevance of Mugler as a defense to a takings
claim, and cited Mugler to keep open the possibility that the government in First English might be
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of substantive due process law, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court called
Pennsylvania Coal a “watershed decision” in takings law, but did not
even mention Mugler.177 Time has proved Pennsylvania Coal worthy of
respect, but has left Mugler behind.
Because Mugler plays no meaningful role in federal takings law, no
foundation exists for the Mugler-inspired police-power-or-eminentdomain dichotomy at the heart of the Washington takings analysis. The
essential lesson from the U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle is that due
process and takings analyses must be applied independently; a regulation
may or may not violate due process protections, but that has nothing to
do with whether the regulation constitutes a taking.178 Government
action may continue to be a valid exercise of the police power (and thus
survive a due process challenge) even if, as cautioned by Pennsylvania
Coal, it also goes “too far” and constitutes a taking. The same action can
violate neither, one, or both constitutional provisions.179 The U.S.
Constitution does not force a binary choice.
Because the police-power-or-eminent-domain dichotomy is illusory,
there is no basis for Washington to allow local governments to evade a
takings claim simply by demonstrating that the challenged action is an
exercise of the police power, and thereby necessarily proving that the
action cannot also be an exercise of eminent domain power subject to a
takings claim. One has nothing to do with the other. The extent to which
a government action resembles an act of eminent domain is at the heart
of any takings analysis because an effective ouster from one’s domain is
a “touchstone” of a taking.180 But assessing the extent to which the
government action does not resemble a valid exercise of the police
power is irrelevant to a takings analysis. If a property owner has been
ousted, it should not matter whether the ouster resulted from an exercise
of the police power.

able to demonstrate on remand that its challenged action was “insulated [from a taking claim] as a
part of the State’s authority to enact safety regulations.” First English, 482 U.S. at 313; accord
Groen & Stephens, supra note 151, at 1262 (asserting that the tension between Mugler and
Pennsylvania Coal “reached its peak” in First English and another decision issued the same year).
177. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
178. See generally supra text accompanying notes 20–31 (discussing Lingle’s role in federal
takings law).
179. Federal decisions in the wake of Lingle recognize that property owners may maintain
separate takings and due process challenges in the same suit. See, e.g., North Pacifica LLC v. City
of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 484–85 (9th Cir. 2008); Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley,
506 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 2007).
180. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
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It is difficult to blame the Washington State Supreme Court for
confusing takings and due process law in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
At that time, “[c]onfusion over the proper role of substantive due process
and over the relationship between due process and takings [was] a
pervasive problem . . . .”181 The U.S. Supreme Court itself did not rid the
federal takings analysis of due process elements until Lingle in 2005.182
But even if the Washington State Supreme Court could have legitimately
justified structuring a unique state takings analysis around the policepower-or-eminent-domain dichotomy two decades ago, the Court cannot
sustain that justification today.
3.

The Washington Analysis Is Constitutionally Insufficient Because,
by Design, It Hampers Property Owners’ Ability to Press Takings
Claims

The Washington State Supreme Court’s rationale for a unique
Washington takings analysis not only lacks a foundation in law, but also
calls into question the constitutional adequacy of the Washington
analysis. Federal constitutional provisions set the floor—the minimum
level of protection accorded individual rights against intrusion by the
government.183 The Washington State Supreme Court embraced a
takings analysis designed to fall below this floor of protection.
In Orion, the Court conceded that “the federal approach may in some
instance provide broader protection” than the Washington approach.184
That concession rings true because the Washington approach employs
substantive due process law to enhance protections for local
governments,185 not property owners. Orion could afford to be frank

181. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, supra note 61, at 1081; accord Orion
Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 653, 747 P.2d 1062, 1079 (1987); see also Spencer, Regulatory
Taking, supra note 43, § 110.4, at 110-14 (“[T]he vacuum in federal jurisprudence occurred at the
very time when state courts, including Washington courts, were required by a series of cases to
confront the issue [of what constitutes a taking].”).
182. See generally supra text accompanying notes 20–31 (discussing Lingle’s role in federal
takings law).
183. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 652, 747 P.2d at 1079 (“It is well recognized . . . that the federal
constitution sets a minimum floor of protection below which state law may not go.”). Because states
may not provide less protection for individuals, the Washington State Supreme Court does not
engage in constitutional analyses distinct from federal analyses unless “the constitution of the State
of Washington should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than does the United
States Constitution.” State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986) (emphasis
added).
184. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 657–58, 747 P.2d at 1082.
185. See supra Part II.B.1.
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about the fact that the Washington analysis may set a lower floor of
takings protection for individuals because Orion opted not to embrace a
unique Washington analysis and expressly decided the better course was
to follow the federal analysis.186
The Washington State Supreme Court ultimately did not heed the
caution advised by Orion. By embracing the unique Washington analysis
outlined in the Orion dictum on the mistaken belief that Orion
harmonized Washington and federal takings law, Presbytery and
subsequent Washington State Supreme Court decisions set a lower floor
of takings protection for individuals. The Washington analysis was
designed to offer the government an opportunity to defeat a takings
claim and avoid paying compensation, albeit in exchange for facing a
substantive due process challenge.187 Therefore, to enhance protections
for government, the Washington analysis diverts property owners from
the Fifth Amendment remedy of compensation and toward the
Fourteenth Amendment remedy of invalidating the challenged
government action.
In an analogous situation, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state
court’s attempt to substitute invalidation for compensation was
“constitutionally insufficient.” In First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,188 the Court considered
whether the government owed compensation for the time during which it
applied a regulation ultimately found to effect a taking, or whether
invalidation of the regulation was sufficient.189 A California court had
decided that invalidation was the appropriate remedy by reasoning that
the threat of paying compensation would inhibit salutary land use
regulation: “In combination, the need for preserving a degree of freedom
in the land-use planning function, and the inhibiting financial force
186. Id. at 657, 747 P.2d at 1081–82. For a fuller discussion of the evolution of the Washington
analysis, including Orion’s role, see supra text accompanying notes 111–37.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 159–63. For example, by demonstrating only that a
challenged regulation is designed more to prevent a harm than to provide an affirmative public
benefit, a government can defeat a takings claim under the Washington analysis. See, e.g., Connor
v. City of Seattle, 153 Wash. App. 673, 700, 223 P.3d 1201, 1214–15 (2009) (finding no need to
engage in further takings analysis after concluding that the challenged regulation safeguards the
public interest in the environment), review denied, 168 Wash. 2d 1040, 233 P.3d 889 (2010);
Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 773–74, 102 P.3d 173, 180–81 (2004)
(declining to consider a plaintiff’s Penn Central argument because the court had answered the
various “threshold questions” in the negative); Jones v. King Cnty., 74 Wash. App. 467, 479–80,
874 P.2d 853, 859 (1994) (failing to mention, let alone reach, the Penn Central factors after
answering the “impose an affirmative public benefit” question in the negative).
188. 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987).
189. Id. at 306–07.

021911WDR Wynne Post DTP Post Final Author Read.docx (Do Not Delete)

162

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

21/02/2011 04:40

[Vol. 86:125

which inheres in the [compensation] remedy, persuade us that on
balance mandamus or declaratory relief rather than [compensation] is the
appropriate relief under the circumstances.”190 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed and held that where government action amounts to a taking,
invalidation of the action cannot relieve the government of “the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective.”191 The Court concluded that a desire to shield government
from the risk of compensation cannot trump the Fifth Amendment:
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen
to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners
and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting
land-use regulations. But such consequences necessarily flow
from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right;
many of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit
the flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities, and the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of
them.192
The Washington takings analysis suffers from the same constitutional
infirmity. Like the California court reined in by First English, the
Washington State Supreme Court has decided to shield government
policy-makers from the specter of the compensation remedy by
channeling property owners toward the invalidation remedy.193 Under
First English, this is constitutionally insufficient.194 If government action

190. Id. at 317 (quoting the language of the opinion of the California Court of Appeals, which the
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed directly after the California State Supreme Court denied review); see
id. at 308–09 (history of the state proceedings).
191. Id. at 321.
192. Id. at 321; see also id. at 317 (“We, of course, are not unmindful of these considerations
[regarding the possible inhibition of land use regulation], but they must be evaluated in the light of
the command of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
193. See, e.g., Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 332–33, 787 P.2d 907,
913–14 (1990) (“Invalidation of the ordinance (instead of compensation) also avoids intimidating
the legislative body . . . .”); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 649, 747 P.2d 1062, 1077
(1987). (“Undoubtedly, the specter of strict financial liability will intimidate legislative bodies from
making the difficult, but necessary choices presented by the most sensitive environmental land-use
problems.”).
194. Orion aptly recognized that First Evangelical “invalidat[ed] as violative of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments the California rule limiting the remedy for a regulatory taking to
invalidation.” Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 652, 747 P.2d at 1079. Yet that observation—like Orion’s
rejection of a unique Washington’s takings analysis—was lost on the Washington State Supreme
Court as it embraced and tinkered with the Washington analysis from Presbytery in 1990 through
Guimont I and Margola in 1993. See supra text accompanying notes 111–37 (discussing the
evolution of the Washington takings analysis); accord Jill M. Teutsch, Comment, Taking Issue With
Takings: Has the Washington Supreme Court Gone Too Far?, 66 WASH. L. REV. 545, 546 (1991)
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constitutes a taking under the federal analysis, compensation is due.
Washington may not lower that floor of constitutional protection.195
C.

Each of the Unique Elements of the Washington Takings Analysis
Offers Little Value or Has Been Discredited by the U.S. Supreme
Court

Setting aside the Washington State Supreme Court’s constitutionally
dubious mission of shielding government from the specter of paying
compensation, might there still be value in the three unique elements
distinguishing the Washington takings analysis from its federal
counterpart? Those elements require a court to ask whether the
challenged government action:
1. destroys some “other fundamental attribute” of property
ownership (beyond constituting a physical invasion or a
deprivation of all economically viable use);
2. seeks less to prevent a harm than to impose on those
regulated the requirement of providing an affirmative public
benefit; and
3. substantially advances a legitimate state interest.196
Washington’s unique elements offer little value or have been discredited
by the U.S. Supreme Court. They cannot justify the unique Washington
takings analysis.

(concluding that Presbytery “fails to comport with federal precedent” and thus is “constitutionally
suspect”).
195. Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994) (“The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution [is] made applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). It does not matter that, through a federal statute, a property owner
might be entitled to compensation for damages resulting from a government action that denies the
property owner due process. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II),
131 Wash. 2d 640, 651–54, 935 P.2d 555, 561–62 (1997). Practically, that alternative remedy would
be unavailable in a situation where government action takes private property without also violating
due process protections. See supra note 12 (current statements of the substantive due process test)
and Part II.B.2 (explaining that an action that takes property need not also violate due process
protections). Legally, a court should not deny a remedy provided by the U.S. Constitution—the
highest law of the land—just because a statute might yield a similar remedy in some situations.
196. These elements are discussed in greater detail supra in text accompanying notes 48–66, and
are depicted in the figure following note 44.
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The “Fundamental Attribute” Element Stems from an Incorrect
Prediction About the Direction of Federal Law, and Can Be
Subsumed into the Penn Central Factors

At heart, asking whether a government action destroys some other
fundamental right of property ownership raises the question of what
“property” means. That is a necessary question because there is nothing
relevant to “take” within the meaning of constitutional protections if the
regulation does not affect “property.”197
But why make this a separate inquiry? The question of whether a
“fundamental” property ownership interest is affected could be
addressed through application of the Penn Central factors. The first
factor requires a court to consider the regulation’s impact on the
property owner—an exercise that must include an evaluation of the
owner’s underlying property interest.198 Elevating this to a separate,
“threshold” inquiry is redundant.
Another reason to question the “other fundamental attribute” element
is its origin as an incorrect prediction about the direction of federal
takings law. Moreover, that prediction was offered not in Washington
case law,199 but in a 1989 law review article.200 Published two years after
the Washington State Supreme Court began articulating a unique

197. See, e.g., Manufactured. Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 363–64, 13
P.3d 183, 191 (2000) (“Before engaging in a takings analysis, however, it must first be determined
if ‘property’ has actually been taken.”).
198. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978) (discussing
“decisions in which this Court has dismissed ‘taking’ challenges on the ground that, while the
challenged government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that were
sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute ‘property’ for
Fifth Amendment purposes”).
199. The phrase “fundamental attribute” appears in Orion, the 1987 decision that triggered the
evolution of the current Washington takings analysis, but the phrase appears only in the portion of
the decision where the Court ultimately resolved the case by applying the federal Penn Central
factors. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 664–65, 747 P.2d at 1085. In that passage, Orion was applying
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), a case that itself invoked the
ad hoc Penn Central factors—factors common to the federal and the Washington takings analyses.
See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 494–95. The point of that passage was simply that, because the property
owner could identify no fundamental attribute of property ownership that the challenged regulation
extinguished, the property owner was limited to arguing that a mere reduction in property value was
sufficient to constitute a taking under what was effectively the Penn Central factors. Orion, 109
Wash. 2d at 664–65, 747 P.2d at 1085. By contrast, under the takings analysis constructed by the
Washington State Supreme Court in subsequent decisions, a property owner who cannot
demonstrate that a fundamental attribute of property ownership has been extinguished fails to
answer one of the “threshold questions” in the affirmative and risks never being able to apply the
Penn Central factors.
200. Settle, supra note 154.
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Washington takings analysis in Orion, the article attempted to discern
order amid the apparent chaos of federal law not from articulated
standards, but by inferring principles and doctrine from the results of
case law.201 The article observed that, at that time, the U.S. Supreme
Court had “never held a regulation that merely restricts use, no matter
how severely, to be a taking.”202 The article reasoned that, “[u]nless or
until the Supreme Court holds that the taking clause is no longer
applicable to use regulation cases, much can be done to reduce confusion
about the governing principles.”203 According to the article, a
“threshold” governing principle was the need to identify regulations that
affect fundamental attributes of property ownership:
This threshold principle, consistently implied but never clearly
articulated by the courts, effectively recognizes that there are
two categories of police power regulation that are subject to
quite different taking standards. These categories divide
regulations, on the basis of their purpose and effect, into those
that effectively deprive a property owner of a fundamental
attribute of property and those that do not.204
This distinction was so important, the article concluded, that it should be
made “at the beginning of the taking inquiry.”205
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately did not follow the path down
which the article inferred the Court was headed. In its 1992 Lucas
decision, the Court undermined the premise of the article’s analysis by
holding that a regulation that only restricts the use of property can be a
taking, if the regulation deprives the property owner of “all
economically beneficial uses” of the property.206 Contrary to the article’s
prediction, the U.S. Supreme Court has not employed a “fundamental
attribute” distinction as a separate question, threshold or otherwise.207
201. The author was frank about his use of inference. See, e.g., id. at 354 (“[D]octrine may be
inferable from some of the decisions even though it has not been fully articulated.”); see also id. at
389 n.308 (acknowledging that a particular inference had not “been clearly or fully articulated by
the courts. However, to the extent that the doctrine is unarticulated and intuitive, coherent principles
explaining outcomes are inferable”); id. at 402 (“This Article focused on what is and, by logical
inference and extrapolation, what might be the law of regulatory takings.”).
202. Id. at 391.
203. Id. at 392.
204. Id. at 386–87 (footnotes omitted).
205. Id. at 389.
206. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (emphasis in original).
207. Although the article’s predictions ultimately proved incorrect, one should not judge the
article too harshly. At the time, both federal and Washington takings jurisprudence was in a state of
flux. The article appropriately called for greater clarity from courts, cautioning that, “[w]ithout a
solid foundation of guiding principles, largely intuitive judicial responses and vague, somewhat
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The Washington State Supreme Court did not have the benefit of
hindsight as it began constructing a unique Washington takings analysis.
In Presbytery, issued after Orion but before Lucas, the Court grafted the
article’s inferred threshold “fundamental attribute” question onto the
Washington analysis. Citing the 1989 article liberally, the Court
concluded that, to determine whether to apply a due process or a takings
analysis to a challenged regulation, one of the first questions courts
should ask is “whether the regulation destroys one or more of the
fundamental attributes of ownership . . . .”208 Once grafted, this element
remained a part of the Washington analysis,209 despite its grounding in
what proved to be an incorrect prediction about the direction in which
federal takings law was headed.
2.

The “Seeks Less to Prevent a Harm than Provide a Public Benefit”
Element Is Unworkable and Premised on Due Process Law, Not
Takings Law

Like the “fundamental attribute” element of the Washington analysis,
the “seeks less to prevent a harm than provide a public benefit” element
is also undermined by its conceptual roots. The Washington State
Supreme Court developed this harm-benefit element from substantive
due process law,210 and the Washington Court of Appeals has referred to
this element as a “due process takings analysis.”211 But as explained by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle in 2005, due process law has no place
in a takings analysis.212
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the harm-benefit element is
unworkable. When the Washington State Supreme Court announced it in
Presbytery, the Court acknowledged “that the determination of whether
aimless doctrine seem inevitable.” Settle, supra note 154, at 402. U.S. Supreme Court takings case
law after 1989, culminating in Lingle in 2005, did much to provide the guiding principles to federal
takings law that the article called for in 1989, even if those principles ultimately proved to be
different from the principles that the article’s author inferred from pre-1989 federal case law.
208. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329–30, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990).
209. See Manufactured. Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 363, 13 P.3d 183,
191 (2000) (treating the Settle article as the source of the “fundamental attribute” element);
Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 603, 854 P.2d 1, 8 (1993); Robinson v. City of
Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49–50, 52, 830 P.2d 318, 328–29 (1992).
210. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329, 787 P.2d at 912; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d
621, 650–51, 747 P.2d 1062, 1078 (1987).
211. Conner v. City of Seattle, 153 Wash. App. 673, 700, 223 P.3d 1201, 1214 (2009), review
denied, 168 Wash. 2d 1040, 233 P.3d 889 (2010).
212. See generally supra text accompanying notes 20–31 (discussing Lingle’s role in federal
takings law).
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a given regulation seeks to protect the public from harm will not always
be an easy decision. Both the conferral of benefit and the prevention of
harm are often present in varying degrees.”213 Nevertheless, the
Washington State Supreme Court adhered to that element.214 By
contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court made a similar observation two years
later in Lucas and used it to bar a harm-benefit element from entering
federal takings law. Lucas observed that such an element would call for
a distinction that “is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an
objective, value-free basis . . . .”215 “[T]he distinction between ‘harmpreventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is often in the eye of the
beholder . . . . Whether one or the other of the competing
characterizations will come to one’s lips in a particular case depends
primarily upon one’s evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real
estate.”216
Although the Washington State Supreme Court altered its takings
analysis in Guimont I to embrace the “total [regulatory] taking” element
introduced by Lucas a year earlier,217 the Court failed to heed Lucas’s
apt rejection of a harm-benefit element. The Washington State Supreme
Court apparently felt it needed even clearer guidance on the question
from the U.S. Supreme Court:
Several parties and the concurrence argue this part of the
[Washington] threshold test is undermined by language in Lucas
questioning harm versus benefit analysis . . . .We decline to
address their arguments [because] . . . . it would be premature to
begin dismantling our takings framework, carefully crafted in
Presbytery, Sintra, and Robinson, without more definitive
guidance on this issue from the United States Supreme Court.
Therefore, we decline to further modify our framework at this
time and reserve discussion of additional modifications, if any,

213. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329 n.13, 787 P.2d at 912 n.13.
214. Id. (“[T]he initial decision as to whether the predominant goal of the regulation is the
prevention of a real harm to the public or the conferral of a benefit upon other publicly held
property must be made according to the facts of each individual case.”); see also Guimont I, 121
Wash. 2d at 594–95, 600, 603, 854 P.2d at 6, 9, 10–11 (reciting this element in the Washington
takings analysis).
215. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992).
216. Id. at 1024–25.
217. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594–604, 854 P.2d at 5–11; Eustis, supra note 124, at 1202–
03 (calling, before Guimont I, for the integration of Lucas into the Washington takings analysis).
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until we are presented with a case that squarely addresses the
issue.218
Evidently, the Washington State Supreme Court has not yet found the
opportunity to address this issue. The impractical harm-benefit element
remains an unwelcome and unworkable fixture of the Washington
takings analysis.
3.

The “Substantially Advances a Legitimate State Interest” Element
Has Been Rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court

Little more need be said about Washington’s “substantially advances
a legitimate state interest” element than what the U.S. Supreme Court
said in Lingle when extirpating that element from the federal takings
analysis.219 In sum, Lingle abandoned the very federal case law on which
Washington courts relied when including the “substantially advances”
element in the Washington analysis.220
Almost immediately after Lingle was announced in 2005, the
Washington Court of Appeals noted that Lingle may affect the
Washington analysis.221 The dissenting judge in that case was more
blunt. She correctly characterized Lingle as rendering the “substantially
advances” test “doctrinally and practically untenable in takings
analysis”222 and predicted that Lingle would ultimately result in the
Washington analysis being “replaced by the takings analysis recently
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Lingle . . . .”223 The
Washington State Supreme Court, however, has not yet examined the
import of Lingle for the Washington takings analysis.

218. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603 n.5, 854 P.2d at 11 n.5 (citation omitted); accord Margola
Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 645 n.7, 854 P.2d 23, 34 n.7 (1993) (nearly identical
footnote in Guimont I’s companion decision). At the time, some scholars recognized that Lucas
should have gutted the “seeks less to prevent a harm than provide a public benefit” element of the
Washington takings analysis. See, e.g., Groen & Stephens, supra note 151, at 1293 (“Lucas directly
undermines the core component of Washington’s threshold inquiry.”); Elaine Spencer, Dashed
“Investment-Backed” Expectations: Will the Constitution Protect Property Owners from Excesses
in Implementation of the Growth Management Act?, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1223, 1229
(1993); see also Settle, supra note 154, at 373 (noting, even before Lucas, that this element
“frequently has been criticized as unworkable”).
219. See generally supra text accompanying notes 20–31 (discussing Lingle).
220. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 647, 747 P.2d 1062, 1076 (1987) (quoting
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
221. City of Des Moines v. Gray Buss., LLC, 130 Wash. App. 600, 612 n.33, 124 P.3d 324, 330
n.33 (2005).
222. Id. at 621, 124 P.3d at 335 (Becker, J., dissenting).
223. Id.
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III. THE PATH OUT OF THE QUAGMIRE: ADOPT THE
FEDERAL ANALYSIS
The time has come to reform the confounding and unfounded
Washington takings analysis. Reform would be straightforward: adopt
the federal takings analysis. Overruling Washington’s takings case law
would be consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis and the
Washington State Supreme Court’s professed intent to coordinate
Washington and federal law. While conceding that it failed to implement
that intent two decades ago, the Court should also correct its other
mischaracterizations of the federal takings analysis, and should avoid the
temptation to justify the Washington takings analysis on independent
state constitutional grounds for the first time.
A.

The Washington State Supreme Court Can Reverse Course While
Remaining Consistent with the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the
Court’s Original Intent to Track Federal Law

Abandoning the Washington takings analysis in favor of the federal
analysis would mean overruling nearly twenty years of Washington case
law. The doctrine of stare decisis, designed “to accomplish the requisite
element of stability in court-made law,”224 might counsel against such a
reversal. But that doctrine is not absolute. Courts will abandon an
established rule of law “when reason so requires” upon a “clear
showing” that the rule is “incorrect and harmful.”225 Nearly two decades
of experience with the Washington takings analysis prove that it is both
incorrect and harmful. Among other things, the Washington analysis is a
failed attempt to coordinate Washington and federal law. This failure has
left Washington with law that harms not only property owners, whose
takings claims may be diverted into due process claims more readily
than under federal law, but also attorneys and federal and lower court
judges, who must struggle to make sense of a needlessly convoluted
body of law.226
224. In re Rights to Use Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wash. 2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508, 511
(1970).
225. Id.
226. This is not to suggest that the federal analysis is flawless. By inviting case-by-case
assessments, the Penn Central factors at the heart of the federal and Washington takings analyses
continue to insert an element of unpredictability and have long been the subject of pointed critiques.
See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (noting that each of the Penn
Central factors “has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions”); Spencer, Dashed “InvestmentBacked” Expectations, supra note 218, at 1226–27; Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due
Process, supra note 61, at 1069.
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Rejecting the Washington analysis in favor of the federal analysis
would not be an abrupt about-face because the Washington State
Supreme Court always intended to harmonize Washington and federal
takings law.227 In Orion in 1987, this attempt at harmonizing meant
applying federal case law instead of what the Washington State Supreme
Court identified as a distinct analysis lurking in Washington case law.228
In subsequent decisions, fostering harmony meant following and
refining the Washington analysis precisely because the Court believed,
albeit mistakenly, that Orion had coordinated the Washington and
federal analyses.229 Even though the Court failed to act on its intent
correctly, that intent remained clear: to apply an analysis at least
equivalent to the federal analysis. The best way to implement that intent
is to adopt the federal analysis.
B.

Adopting the Federal Takings Analysis Would Mean Adhering to
the Language of the Federal Analysis

Washington takings case law is plagued by mischaracterizations of
the federal analysis and its elements. These misstatements risk confusing
readers and tugging Washington law in unintended directions. The
Washington State Supreme Court would do well to correct these errors
and avoid similar missteps in the future by adhering to the precise
language of the federal analysis.
1.

The Penn Central Factors Cannot Be Reduced to a “Balancing
Test”

The Washington State Supreme Court miscasts the Penn Central
factors. Because the U.S. Supreme Court “ha[d] been unable to develop
any ‘set formula’” for identifying government actions that amount to a
taking, the Court in Penn Central turned to “essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries.”230 The primary factors relevant to those inquires are the
“economic impact of the regulation” on the property owner, the “extent

227. This was clear to at least one federal court, which concluded that “Washington state courts
have expressed an intent for a regulatory takings analysis to be consistent with the federal
constitution.” Heitman v. City of Spokane Valley, No. CV-09-0070-FVS, 2010 WL 816727, at *4
(E.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2010) (citing Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 657–58, 747 P.2d 1062,
1081–82 (1987)).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 111–14.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 118–37.
230. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and the “character of the governmental action.”231
The Washington State Supreme Court seemingly fails to appreciate
that the Penn Central factors cannot be reduced to a formula or test. The
Court casts the Penn Central factors as implementing a “balancing test”
in which “[t]he court asks whether the state interest in the regulation is
outweighed by its adverse economic impact to the landowner.”232
Although the Washington State and U.S. Supreme Courts employ the
same factors, the U.S. Supreme Court does not share a goal of using
those factors to answer the ultimate question posed by the Washington
State Supreme Court: whether the government interest outweighs the
private impact.
The Washington State Supreme Court should abandon the “balancing
test” mischaracterization of the Penn Central factors for the reasons
described by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle. Lingle rejected the
231. Id.; accord Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39.
232. Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 604, 854 P.2d 1, 11 (1993). Washington
courts that recite this mischaracterization of the Penn Central factors now cite Guimont I as the
source. See, e.g., Peste v. Mason Cnty., 133 Wash. App. 456, 473, 136 P.3d 140, 149 (2006) (citing
Guimont I and Guimont II); Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 767–68, 102 P.3d
173 (2004) (citing Edmonds Shopping Ctr. Assocs. v. City of Edmonds, 117 Wash. App. 344, 362–
63, 71 P.3d 233, 241 (2003) (citing Guimont I); Edmonds, 117 Wash. App. at 363, 71 P.3d at 241
(citing Guimont I); Guimont v. City of Seattle (Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 81, 896 P.2d 70,
76–77 (1995) (citing Guimont I).
The source of Washington’s mischaracterization is unclear. The Washington State Supreme Court
cited no authority for it. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 604, 854 P.2d at 11. Although the Court
cited two of its own precedents as authority for the Penn Central factors, those decisions provide no
support for characterizing the factors as a “balancing test.” See id. (citing Presbytery of Seattle v.
King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 335–36, 787 P.2d 907, 915 (1990); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119
Wash. 2d 34, 51, 830 P.2d 318, 328 (1992)). To the extent those precedents discussed a balancing
test, those discussions were in the context of substantive due process claims, not takings claims.
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330–31, 787 P.2d at 912–13; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 51–52, 830
P.2d at 328–29. Whether this means that the Washington State Supreme Court mistakenly
transposed the “balancing test” from substantive due process case law and the Washington takings
analysis remains a matter of speculation.
Even if not attributed to a particular source, the “balancing test” mischaracterization might not
have been plucked from thin air. One other reference to a balancing test can be found in the case
law that led to the current Washington takings analysis. Orion reported that, under the federal
takings analysis, a taking can result “if the property owner suffers an economic deprivation
significant enough to outweigh the public interest served by the regulation.” Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at
655, 747 P.2d at 1080; see also id., 109 Wash. 2d at 647, 747 P.2d at 1076 (similar statement). For
that proposition, Orion cited Keystone, in which the U.S. Supreme Court quoted Agins as saying
that the question of whether a taking has occurred “necessarily requires a weighing of private and
public interests.” See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987)
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260–261 (1980)). Whether that means that Agins—which
Lingle ultimately ejected from federal takings law, see supra text accompanying notes 20–31—was
the ultimate source of the “balancing test” mischaracterization also remains speculative.
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notion that a court should consider a regulation’s ability to advance the
public interest when assessing whether the regulation effects a taking.233
Instead, the Penn Central factors, like the other elements of the federal
takings analysis, “focus[] directly upon the severity of the burden that
government imposes upon private property rights.”234 To measure that
burden, the Penn Central factors “turn[] in large part, albeit not
exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and
the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.”235
On its face, the Penn Central factor that probes the character of the
government action236 might seem to invite an assessment of the public
interest in that action. But this factor considers only the severity of the
burden on the property owner, asking whether the burden is more like an
ouster from one’s domain (which a court may find more readily to be a
taking) than “some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good” (which is less likely to be a
taking).237 Because that inquiry omits any consideration of the public
interest, there is no basis for characterizing this Penn Central factor as
placing the common good and private impact on opposite sides of a scale
to gauge their relative weight.
2.

The Federal Analysis Cannot Be Summarized as an Assessment of
Whether a Burden Should, “In All Fairness and Justice,” Be Borne
by the Public as a Whole

As part of a reform of Washington takings law, the Washington State
Supreme Court should disavow another mischaracterization of federal
law that threatens to creep into Washington case law. Quoting the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Armstrong v. United States,238 the
Washington State Supreme Court stated in Mission Springs, Inc. v. City
of Spokane239 that “[t]he talisman of a taking is government action which
forces some private persons alone to shoulder affirmative public
233. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (“The notion that . . . a regulation . . . ‘takes’ private
property for public use merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.”); see
generally id. at 542–43.
234. Id. at 539.
235. Id. at 540.
236. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
237. Id.; accord Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (“Each [element in the federal takings analysis] aims to
identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government
directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”).
238. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
239. 134 Wash. 2d 947, 954 P.2d 250 (1998).
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burdens, ‘which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole.’”240
This “talisman” has so far gained no additional traction. Mission
Springs remains the only majority opinion in which the Court
proclaimed this “in all fairness and justice” takings litmus test.241 This is
not surprising because Mission Springs turned solely on a due process
claim.242
The Washington State Supreme Court should continue to ignore this
“talisman,” no matter how pithy it might appear, for four reasons. First,
the “in all fairness and justice” test arises from dictum in Armstrong,
which was decided in 1960 and does not reflect a half century of
subsequent federal takings case law. Even under takings jurisprudence
then in effect, the U.S. Supreme Court did not invoke “in all fairness and
justice” to resolve Armstrong. That case involved a straightforward
claim by a subcontractor on a shipbuilding project.243 At the time the
federal government took possession of certain hulls under construction,
the subcontractor had not been paid, so it asserted liens under state law
for materials it furnished to the project’s prime contractor.244 The federal
government refused to honor the liens.245 The U.S. Supreme Court sided
with the subcontractor for the unremarkable reason that “[t]he total
destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which
constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth
Amendment ‘taking[,]’”246 giving rise to the “constitutional obligation to
pay just compensation for the value of the liens the petitioners lost and
of which loss the Government was the direct, positive beneficiary.”247
None of this reasoning involved determining whether the
subcontractor was bearing a burden that society as a whole should bear.

240. Id. at 964, 954 P.2d at 258 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
241. The author of the majority opinion in Mission Springs continued to cite this test as a holding
in several of his concurring and dissenting opinions. E.g., Eggleston v. Pierce Cnty., 148 Wash. 2d
760, 779, 64 P.3d 618, 629 (2002) (Sanders, J., dissenting); Asarco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 145
Wash. 2d 750, 777–82, 43 P.3d 471, 484–86 (2001) (Sanders, J., dissenting); Manufactured. Hous.
Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 381, 13 P.3d 183, 200 (2000) (Sanders, J.,
concurring).
242. See, e.g., Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 963, 954 P.2d at 257 (“This situation must be
analyzed under well-established due process criteria as distinguished from that associated with
taking property without just compensation.”).
243. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 41.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 41–42.
246. Id. at 48.
247. Id. at 49.
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Because Armstrong was a simple case of government paying for what it
appropriates, Armstrong is consistent with Lingle’s statement forty-five
years later of the “touchstone” of a taking: “actions that are functionally
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property . . . .”248 It is only in Armstrong’s
concluding paragraph that the Court indulged in a rhetorical flourish
about the “design” or purpose of the federal Takings Clause.249 The
Court cited no authority for this indulgence, and followed it immediately
with a statement that resolution of the case turned on the Court’s
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment itself, not on some intent lurking
in that provision’s design:
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not
be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole. A fair interpretation of this
constitutional protection entitles these lienholders to just
compensation here.250
Second, even though federal and Washington courts have repeated
Armstrong’s statement about the design or purpose of the Takings
Clause,251 and even though a desire to advance that purpose arguably
motivated what became the Penn Central factors in the federal takings
analysis,252 the U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected Armstrong’s “in
248. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
249. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. E.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617–18 (2001) (noting the inquiries that
make up the federal takings analysis “are informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause”); E.
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998) (describing the “aim” of the Federal Takings Clause);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (describing the “principal purposes” of the
Takings Clause); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987) (same); First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1987) (describing the
“design[]” of the Takings Clause); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d
347, 371, 13 P.3d 183 (2000) (describing the “design[]” of the Takings Clause, not a test through
which to apply that clause); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 648–49, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987)
(using “justice and fairness” to describe the “primary problem” with excessive regulation, which
can be addressed either through a takings analysis or a due process analysis); In re 14255 53rd Ave.
S., 120 Wash. App. 737, 748–49, 86 P.3d 222, 227 (2004) (declining to apply “all fairness and
justice” as a takings element); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 103 Wash. App. 721,
724–25, 14 P.3d 172 (2000) (describing the “purpose” of the Takings Clause, not a test for it);
Burton v. Clark Cnty., 91 Wash. App. 505, 515, 958 P.2d 343, 350 (1998) (same).
252. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522–23 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978). Two scholars characterize this case law as the Court
“stress[ing] the importance of determining whether the government action unfairly shifts public
burdens onto private individuals.” Groen & Stephens, supra note 151, at 1281. However, a closer
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all fairness and justice” language as a test in the federal takings analysis.
Although Lingle quoted Armstrong as a justification for the federal
takings test,253 Lingle rejected an attempt to use Armstrong as part of the
test itself:
[The property owner] appeals to the general principle that the
Takings Clause is meant “‘to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” But that
appeal is clearly misplaced . . . [because a] test that tells us
nothing about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or
how that burden is allocated, cannot tell us when justice might
require that the burden be spread among taxpayers through the
payment of compensation.254
Instead of a test that identifies what burdens should properly be borne by
the public as a whole, Lingle says that the primary touchstone of takings
law is a test that discerns “regulatory actions that are functionally
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”255
Instead of first probing the justification for or distribution of the burden,
the focus must be “directly upon the severity of the burden that
government imposes upon private property rights.”256 That focus is
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that any
compensation required by the Takings Clause “is measured by the
property owner’s loss rather than the government’s gain.”257 It does not
matter what the government gets from the taking or even whether the
government should have secured it from others. What matters is that the
government pays the property owner the value of the property lost by the
owner.

reading of this case law reveals that the U.S. Supreme Court, while keeping an eye on the framers’
intent of ensuring fair distribution of burdens within society, developed the Penn Central factors
precisely because the Court did not want to make unbounded determinations about “justice and
fairness” in a given case—just as it could not derive a “set formula” that would rigidly dictate all
cases. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (“[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any
‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons.”).
253. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
254. Id. at 542–43 (citation omitted).
255. Id. at 539.
256. Id. (emphasis added).
257. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235–36 (2003).
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Finally, “in all fairness and justice” is too subjective to use as a
constitutional test. A former Washington State Supreme Court justice
illustrated this point by once dissenting on the grounds that “fairness and
justice” required a finding of a taking:258 “I would conclude by any
traditional notion of justice . . . [that the situation presented by the
plaintiff] deeply offends fundamental notions of fairness and justice.”259
A constitutional test should rely on more than sticking one’s fingers into
the wind of “traditional notions” of fairness and justice to probe the
depth of a perceived offense.
3.

Other Misstatements of the Federal Elements Are Needlessly
Confusing

Other misstatements of the federal takings analysis lurk in
Washington case law. For example, although federal courts use one of
the Penn Central factors to consider the economic impact of the
challenged regulation on the property owner,260 Washington courts
purport to use that factor to consider the economic impact on the
property itself.261
Another error occurs in Washington’s version of the “total
[regulatory] taking” element. Federal courts ask whether government
action deprives the property owner of all economically “beneficial”
use,262 but Washington courts ask whether the action deprives the owner
of all economically “viable” use.263
258. Asarco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 145 Wash. 2d 750, 777–82, 43 P.3d 471, 484–86 (2001)
(Sanders, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 779, 43 P.3d at 485.
260. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Lingle, 544
U.S. at 538–39.
261. See, e.g., Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 596, 854 P.2d 1, 6 (1993);
Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 335, 787 P.2d 907, 915 (1990).
262. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). The
U.S. and Washington State Supreme Courts initially used “viable” in the context of the Penn
Central factors. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495
(1987) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138 n.36;
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333–34, 787 P.2d at 914; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 655–
56, 747 P.2d 1062, 1081 (1987). The U.S. Supreme Court ceased that practice in Lucas—the 1992
decision that added the “total taking” element to the federal analysis. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019,
1030–31. Since Lucas, that element has employed the term “beneficial,” not “viable.” See, e.g., Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601
(2010); Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
263. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 600, 602, 605, 854 P.2d at 9, 10, 12; Margola Assocs. v. City of
Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 643–44, 854 P.2d 23, 33 (1993). When incorporating Lucas into the
Washington takings analysis, the Washington State Supreme Court appeared to appreciate that
Lucas used “beneficial.” Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 598, 599, 854 P.2d at 8 (quoting Lucas).
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Although these misstatements are unlikely to yield results
substantively different from ones produced by application of the exact
language of the federal analysis, they remain confusing and likely
unintended points of departure between federal and Washington takings
law. They highlight the need for the Washington State Supreme Court to
exercise care when reciting federal takings law.
C.

Attempting to Justify the Washington Takings Analysis on
Independent State Constitutional Grounds Would Be Unwarranted
Historically and Legally

The Washington takings analysis has always been an attempt,
however ill-fated, to track the federal analysis. When the Washington
State Supreme Court revisits its takings jurisprudence, it should not
attempt to justify its twenty-year-old takings analysis on independent
state constitutional grounds. Such an attempt would ignore history and
should fail on its merits.
1.

The Washington State Supreme Court Never Performed a Gunwall
Analysis to Justify Its Unique Takings Analysis

Like all state courts, the Washington State Supreme Court is free to
interpret its state constitution to provide greater protection for individual
rights than does the U.S. Constitution. As explained in the Court’s wellworn Gunwall264 decision, “states can do this because each state has the
‘sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties
more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.’”265
Creating distinct state constitutional law is the exception, not the rule.
The Washington State Supreme Court deems it “self evident
that . . . . state courts should be sensitive to developments in federal
law,” because “[t]he opinions of the [U.S.] Supreme Court, while not
controlling on state courts construing their own constitutions, are
nevertheless important guides on the subjects which they squarely
address.”266 The Washington State Supreme Court therefore resolved
Nevertheless, without explanation, the Court reverted to “viable” in its statement of the Washington
takings analysis. Id. at 600, 602, 605, 854 P.2d at 9, 10, 12; see also Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 643–
44, 854 P.2d at 33.
264. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
265. Id. at 59, 720 P.2d at 811 (quoting Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81
(1980)).
266. Id. at 60–61, 720 P.2d at 812 (quoting State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 964 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1982)
(Handler, J., concurring)). The Washington State Supreme Court has criticized state courts that fail
to explain why they diverge from federal constitutional precedent: “The difficulty with such
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that “[r]ecourse to our state constitution as an independent source for
recognizing and protecting the individual rights of our citizens must
spring not from pure intuition, but from a process that is at once
articulable, reasonable and reasoned.”267 Heeding this lesson, the
Washington State Supreme Court will analyze six nonexclusive
criteria—often called the “Gunwall factors”—before deciding to part
ways with federal case law on matters of constitutional interpretation.268
An attempt to use Gunwall to support the Washington takings
analysis now, more than two decades after its creation, would be an
attempt to rewrite history. The Washington State Supreme Court has
never applied the Gunwall factors to assess whether the Washington
State Constitution offers greater protections to individuals against
uncompensated takings for public use, and thus whether a different
Washington takings analysis is appropriate. Even though Orion, which
spawned the Washington takings analysis, was decided fewer than two
years after Gunwall itself, Orion did not cite Gunwall.269 Guimont I,
which effectively capped the Court’s development of the Washington
takings analysis in 1993,270 did not consider the property “owners’
arguments that the state constitution provides greater protection”
because they had “not briefed the relevant Gunwall factors necessary for
determining whether an independent analysis of the state constitution is
proper.”271 The Washington Court of Appeals has frequently noted the

decisions is that they establish no principled basis for repudiating federal precedent and thus furnish
little or no rational basis for counsel to predict the future course of state decisional law.” Id. at 60,
720 P.2d at 811–12.
267. Id. at 63, 720 P.2d at 813; see also id. at 62–63, 720 P.2d at 813 (stating the Court’s intent to
“use independent state constitutional grounds in a given situation” only “for well founded legal
reasons and not by merely substituting [its] notion of justice for that of . . . the United States
Supreme Court”).
268. Id. at 61–62, 720 P.2d at 812–13. The Washington State Supreme Court characterized the
six criteria as “neutral” and summarized them as: “(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the
texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters
of particular state or local concern.” Id. at 58.
269. See Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 356 n.7, 13 P.3d 183,
187 n.7 (2000) (“[A]lthough Orion was decided 18 months after Gunwall, it makes no reference to
Gunwall.”).
270. See Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 131 Wash. 2d 640, 676–77, 935 P.2d 555, 574
(1997) (Durham, C.J., concurring) (noting that no reconfiguration of the Washington analysis was
needed after 1993 because Guimont I had already integrated the latest U.S. Supreme Court takings
case law).
271. Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 604, 854 P.2d 1, 11 (1993); accord
Manufactured Hous., 142 Wash. 2d at 356 n.7, 13 P.3d at 187 n.7 (“[T]he Guimont court
specifically declined to undertake a state constitutional Gunwall analysis.”).
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absence or insufficiency of any attempt to discern broader state takings
protections through application of the Gunwall factors.272
A trio of Washington State Supreme Court decisions nevertheless
appears to suggest that an application of the Gunwall factors supports
the Washington takings analysis. Those suggestions prove unconvincing
under closer inspection.
The first of this trio is Manufactured Housing Communities of
Washington v. State (Manufactured Housing).273 There, a plurality of the
Court274 invalidated a statute because it purported to authorize the
government to take property for a purpose not authorized by the
Washington State Constitution.275 Although the U.S. Supreme Court
reads the U.S. Constitution to authorize takings that advance what a
legislative body determines to be a public purpose,276 the Washington
State Supreme Court has long held that the Washington State
Constitution authorizes takings only for a narrower set of purposes that
may be deemed a direct public use.277 Manufactured Housing applied the
272. See, e.g., Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Smitch, 87 Wash. App. 27, 32–33, 940 P.2d 274, 276–77
(1997) (noting the continued absence of any Gunwall analysis); Guimont v. City of Seattle
(Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 79 n.4, 896 P.2d 70, 75 n.4 (1995) (“Although [the property
owner] argues that the state constitution affords greater protection to property owners than does the
federal constitution, its argument on the Gunwall factors does not support an independent state
constitutional analysis.”).
273. 142 Wash. 2d 347, 13 P.3d 183 (2000).
274. See id. at 375, 13 P.3d at 197 (showing only three justices concurring in the lead opinion,
with one justice concurring in the result).
275. Id. at 374, 13 P.3d at 196.
276. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005).
277. This law was established well before the advent of the Gunwall factors in 1986. See, e.g.,
Petition of City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 624, 638 P.2d 549, 554–55 (1981); Hogue v. Port of
Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 813, 341 P.2d 171, 178 (1959); State ex rel. Or.–Wash. R.R. &
Navigation Co. v. Superior Court, 155 Wash. 651, 657–58, 286 P. 33, 36 (1930).
This law stemmed from three crucial differences between the federal and Washington takings
provisions. First, the Washington provision adds a key limitation: “Private property shall not be
taken for private use . . . .” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 1920) (emphasis added). This
provision alone makes it much more difficult under the Washington State Constitution for a local
government to condemn private property and convey it to a different set of private hands.
Second, the Washington State Constitution accords no deference to legislative judgment in
determining what constitutes a “public use.” Id. (“Whenever an attempt is made to take private
property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public
shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that
the use is public . . . .”); cf. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480–83 (deferring largely to a local determination of a
public purpose).
Finally, the Washington State Constitution has been frequently amended to define certain
activities as “public uses.” This suggests that, but for these express examples, “public use” has a
relatively narrow meaning under Washington law. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended
1920) (“[T]he taking of private property by the state for land reclamation and settlement purposes is
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Gunwall factors to reaffirm that long-understood difference between
federal and state law on the issue of whether the government may take
property at all, even if the government pays compensation.278
Manufactured Housing did not employ Gunwall to justify a unique
Washington analysis for determining whether the government has
actually taken property.279
In the second case of the trio, Eggleston v. Pierce County,280 the
Washington State Supreme Court exaggerated the reach of
Manufactured Housing’s Gunwall analysis. In Eggleston, the Court
faced the issue of whether damage to a home caused by police gathering
evidence pursuant to a search warrant constituted a taking for which
compensation had to be paid.281 Even though the Court resolved the case
by applying Washington law rather than federal law, the Court did not
apply the Washington takings analysis.282 Instead, the Court looked to
“the principles underlying [its] jurisprudence” (namely, that an exercise
of the police power cannot be a taking)283 and “evidence from an 1886
Oregon Supreme Court case” to conclude that, when the Washington
State Constitution was adopted in 1889, “the production of
evidence . . . would not have been considered a taking.”284 Among its
reasons for omitting the requisite Gunwall analysis, the Court cited
hereby declared to be for public use.”); WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (amended 1966) (“The use of
public funds by port districts in such manner as may be prescribed by the legislature for industrial
development or trade promotion . . . shall be deemed a public use for a public purpose . . . .”);
WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (amended 1985) (“The use of agricultural commodity assessments by
agricultural commodity commissions in such manner as may be prescribed by the legislature for
agricultural development or trade promotion and promotional hosting shall be deemed a public use
for a public purpose . . . .”).
278. Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 356–61, 13 P.3d 183,
187–90 (2000).
279. Consistent with Manufactured Housing’s limited scope, the Washington State Supreme
Court three months later declined, in the absence of a Gunwall analysis, to address whether “the
Washington Takings Clause should be interpreted more expansively than its federal counterpart”
when addressing a claim that a taking actually occurred. Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wash. 2d 12, 33, 18
P.3d 523, 535 (2001). Dean involved a claim that a user fee constituted a taking “in the nature of a
monetary exaction.” Id. at 31–32, 18 P.3d at 534. That claim is subject to a different analysis than
the one at issue in this Article. See id. Dean is nevertheless relevant because it belies later
contentions by the Court that Manufactured Housing obviated future Gunwall analyses of the
differences between the federal and Washington takings clauses. See infra text accompanying notes
280–90.
280. 148 Wash. 2d 760, 64 P.3d 618 (2002).
281. Id. at 763, 64 P.3d at 620.
282. Other than citing Guimont I among a string of other cases, Eggleston did not mention the
Washington takings analysis. See id. at 767, 64 P.3d at 622.
283. This principle is described and critiqued above. See supra Part II.B.
284. Eggleston, 148 Wash. 2d at 769, 64 P.3d at 623.
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Manufactured Housing as though it had already satisfied Gunwall’s
requirements.285 The Court concluded that “the threshold function
Gunwall performs is less necessary when we have already established a
state constitutional provision provides more protection than its federal
counterpart.”286
In the final decision of the trio, Brutsche v. City of Kent,287 the
Washington State Supreme Court attempted to obviate a Gunwall
analysis for all takings issues. Because Brutsche presented the same
issue resolved in Eggleston, the Court resolved Brutsche primarily by
holding that Eggleston was both indistinguishable as a factual matter and
correct as a legal matter.288 In a footnote, Brutsche rehashed Eggleston’s
reasons for not performing a Gunwall analysis.289 The Court concluded
by signaling that it saw no need to apply the Gunwall factors to
Washington’s takings clause: “Because it is settled that article I, section
16 is to be given independent effect, it is unnecessary to engage in a
Gunwall analysis.”290 Unfortunately, as demonstrated by a reading of
Manufactured Housing and Eggleston, no court has addressed, let alone
settled, the matter of whether Washington’s takings clause justifies the
unique Washington takings analysis.
The actual foundation of the Washington analysis is a mistaken belief
that it is equivalent to the federal analysis.291 The Washington State

285. Id. at 766, 64 P.3d at 622 (citing Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington v.
State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 356 n.7, 13 P.3d 183, 187 n.7 (2000), for the proposition that the
Washington takings clause “is significantly different from its United States constitutional
counterpart, and in some ways provides greater protection.”). It is difficult to square that statement
with the Washington State Supreme Court’s 1987 conclusion that “the federal approach [to takings]
may in some instance provide broader protection” than the Washington approach. Orion Corp. v.
State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 657, 747 P.2d 1062, 1082 (1987).
286. Eggleston, 148 Wash. 2d at 767 n.5, 64 P.3d at 622 n.5. Among other reasons for excusing
the requisite Gunwall analysis, the Court reported that “a satisfactory Gunwall analysis was
provided by an amicus.” Id. The Court omitted the fact that the amicus brief focused on the import
of the phrase “or damaged” in the Washington State Constitution—a phrase not employed in
Eggleston or ever invoked to justify the Washington takings analysis. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, Eggleston, 148 Wash. 2d 760, 64 P.3d 618 (2003)
(No. 71296-4), 2002 WL 33003998, at *14–20. The Washington takings clause reads: “No private
property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been
first made . . . .” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 1920) (emphasis added). For a discussion of
whether “or damaged” could be a basis for the unique Washington takings analysis, see infra text
accompanying note 300.
287. 164 Wash. 2d 664, 193 P.3d 110 (2008).
288. Id. at 680–82, 193 P.3d at 119–20.
289. Id. at 680 n.11, 193 P.3d at 119–20 n.11.
290. Id.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 111–22, 228–29.

021911WDR Wynne Post DTP Post Final Author Read.docx (Do Not Delete)

182

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

21/02/2011 04:40

[Vol. 86:125

Supreme Court should not compound that mistake by attempting to
justify the Washington takings analysis as the product of a
Gunwall analysis.
2.

The Gunwall Factors, Even if Applied to Washington’s Takings
Clause, Would Likely Not Justify the Washington Takings Analysis

Even if the Washington State Supreme Court were to perform a
Gunwall analysis now, there is little reason to think that it would justify
a unique Washington takings analysis, especially not the particular
analysis the Court finished creating in 1993. There is no need to belabor
this point with a complete Gunwall analysis, especially when
Washington courts have consciously developed and applied the
Washington takings analysis for two decades in the absence of a relevant
Gunwall analysis.292 Two considerations cast serious doubt on
Gunwall’s ability to justify the Washington takings analysis.
First, a basic premise of Gunwall is that it identifies situations where
“the constitution of the State of Washington should be considered as
extending broader rights to its citizens than does the United States
Constitution.”293 Yet when explaining the Washington takings analysis,
the Washington State Supreme Court first stated that “the breadth of
constitutional protection under the state and federal just compensation
clauses remains virtually identical,”294 and then proclaimed that “[t]he
Washington Constitution provides the same right” as the Federal
Takings Clause.295 More crucially, by deliberately enhancing protection
of government, the Washington analysis provides narrower protection to
individuals,296 not the broader protection fostered by Gunwall. Without
turning Gunwall on its head, the Washington State Supreme Court
cannot now point to the Washington State Constitution to justify a
twenty-year-old analysis that restricts rights afforded by the U.S.
Constitution.

292. See supra text accompanying notes 269–72.
293. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986).
294. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 657, 747 P.2d 1062, 1082 (1987).
295. Sintra v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 13, 829 P.2d 765, 772 (1992); accord
Eustis, supra note 124, at 1193 n.79 (“The Washington State Supreme Court has construed the state
constitutional provision to be identical to that of the federal Constitution.”). The Court added: “State
law may provide useful guidance in this determination, but federal law is ultimately controlling.”
Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 14, 829 P.2d at 772.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 183–95 (discussing why the Washington analysis is
insufficient under the U.S. Constitution).
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Second, the Gunwall factor that assesses differences in the relevant
texts of the two constitutions suggests no basis for an independent
Washington analysis.297 When determining whether a government action
constitutes a taking requiring compensation, there are no significant
differences in the Takings Clauses of the U.S. and Washington State
Constitutions. The federal provision reads: “[N]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”298 Stripped to its
essence, the parallel Washington provision is functionally identical: “No
private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use
without just compensation having been first made . . . .”299 Even though
the Washington takings provision includes the words “or damaged,” the
Washington State Supreme Court has noted that “no Washington
decision has attached significance to the difference in language in the
context of police power regulation,” and suggested that “or damaged”
might have more to do with tort law than takings law.300 To the extent
297. See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 58, 720 P.2d at 811.
298. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
299. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 1920). In full and in context, the Washington takings
clause reads:
Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of necessity, and for
drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary
purposes. No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just
compensation having been first made, or paid into court for the owner, and no right-of-way
shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation other than municipal until full compensation
therefor be first made in money, or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective
of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall
be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in courts of record, in
the manner prescribed by law. Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use
alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a
judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the
use is public: Provided, That the taking of private property by the state for land reclamation
and settlement purposes is hereby declared to be for public use.
Id. (emphasis added). The addition of “or private use” is relevant to the range of purposes for which
the government may take property; that phrase is irrelevant to whether a taking has occurred. See
supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text. On its face, the requirement that compensation be made
“first” is relevant only to the timing of the compensation, not to whether any compensation is due.
300. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 328 n.10, 787 P.2d 907, 911 n.10
(1990); accord Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Smitch, 87 Wash. App. 27, 32, 940 P.2d 274, 276–77
(1997); Settle, supra note 154, at 344. A line of Washington authority relies on the “or damaged”
language in the conceptually distinct situation of government road work substantially impairing
access to one’s property. See, e.g., Pande Cameron & Co. of Seattle, Inc. v. Cent. Puget Sound
Reg’l Transit Auth., 610 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1303–06 (W.D. Wash. 2009), aff’d, 376 F. App’x 672
(9th Cir. 2010) (applying Washington law); Keiffer v. King Cnty., 89 Wash. 2d 369, 372, 572 P.2d
408, 410 (1977); Walker v. State, 48 Wash. 2d 587, 589–90, 295 P.2d 328, 330 (1956); Brown v.
City of Seattle, 5 Wash. 35, 38–41, 31 P. 313, 314–15 (1892); see William B. Stoebuck, A General
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 555 n.8 (1972) (noting the presence of “or
damaged” in twenty-six state constitutions, tracing its origin to Illinois, and explaining that it was
“intended to liberalize the allowance of compensation for loss of certain kinds of property rights,
particularly street access”).
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“or damaged” actually injects notions of tort liability into takings
jurisprudence, that concept is not unique to Washington. Despite the
absence of “or damaged” from the Federal Takings Clause, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that “when the government uses its own
property in such a way that it destroys private property, it has taken that
property.”301
CONCLUSION
In evaluating whether to abandon the Washington takings analysis,
Lingle remains instructive. After examining a twenty-five-year-old
element of its takings analysis, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court
admitted an error, corrected course, and properly clarified the federal
law of takings.302 The Washington State Supreme Court should likewise
examine its twenty-year-old takings analysis, concede its now-evident
flaws, and correct course by adopting the federal analysis. Only then will
Washington’s citizens, attorneys, and judges extricate themselves from a
needless takings quagmire.

301. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2601 (2010). As support for that statement, the U.S. Supreme Court cited cases in which it
found takings where military aircraft flew so low over property as to render it uninhabitable, United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–62 (1946), and where a dam flooded property, Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177–78 (1871).
302. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005). For a discussion of Lingle, see
supra text accompanying notes 20–31.

